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ABSTRACT 
The  floating dollar appears  to be  cyclically unstable  in  the 
long  run.  The  problem  can  be  diagnosed  with  the aid of  dynamic  models. 
However,  this understanding  by  itself is not  sufficient  to  remedy  the 
problem  (through  private speculation);  and,  therefore,  monetary 
authorities  should  be  prepared  to take positions on  the  fundamental-
equilibrium  levels of  exchange  rates. -2-
Toward  Understanding Major  Fluctuations  of  the  Dollar 
"The  dollar  problem"  means  different  things  to  different 
people,  depending  in  most  cases  on  how  they  are  affected  by  the  present 
overvaluation  of  the u.s.  currency.  From  the  perspective  of  the  analyst 
who  attempts  to  understand  the  dollar's  movements  by  formulating  and 
estimating  dynamic  systems  of  equations,  the  dollar  problem  is 
essentially  the  finding  that  underlying  cyclical  tendencies  in  exchange 
rates  for  the  major  currencies  are  not  as  damped  by  anticipation  of 
future  changes  in  exchange  rates  as  most  observers  have  expected  would 
be  the  case  under  "floating"  or  as  they  would  wish  to  see  in  the 
future.  Indeed,  the  cycles  seem  to  be  explosive  in  nature,  implying 
that  certain  aspects  of  the  international adjustment  process  would  need 
to  be  reformed,  or  else that  the  system would  tend  to  bounce  from  crisis 
to  crisis,  making  abrupt  and  radical  changes  in  behavior  on  each  new 
tack.  If society's  clear  preference  is  to  avoid  the  latter outcome  and 
to  embrace  the  former,  then  the  analyst's  job  becomes  that  of  describing 
a  process  of  reform  that would  damp  (or stabilize)  the  cycles. 
Based  on  this  author's  research since  1975  with  dynamic  models 
of  exchange  rate  determination  (focusing  on  rates  against  the  dollar  as 
the  principal  standard  of  the  system),  the  increasingly-solid  conclusion 
is  that  the  present  exchange  rate  system  does  tend  to  generate  cycles, 
that  these,cycles  are  not  damped  (i.e.,  the  system would  generate  swings 
of  increasing amplitude  and  duration,  if it continued  parametrically -3-
unchanged  for  a  long  time),  and  that,  therefore,  the  policy  issue of  how 
to  define  a  temedial  process  is indeed a  pressing one.1/ 
The  positive  and  normative  aspects  of  the  dollar  problem  are 
distinct  and  should  be  dealt  with separately.  The  positive  aspect  is  a 
matter  of  understanding  the  relevant  history,  which  we  will  attempt  to 
do  in  this  paper  by  asking  what  the  data  since  the  early 1970's  suggest 
about  this  cyclical  process.  The  normative  aspect,  treated  more  fully 
in  a  companion  paper,2/  is  to  formulate  a  countervailing  process -- not 
observed  in  history  but  still  feasible  to  implement  as  policy -- that 
would  have  a  stabilizing  effect  on  the  operation  of  the  system  as  a 
whole.  The  normative  aspect  requires  that  we  make  value  judgements  that 
are  not  required  purely  for  the  positive  analysis;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  former  should  follow  from  the  latter much  as  a  doctor's  prescription 
follows  from  his  diagnosis.  We  begin,  therefore,  with  the diagnosis. 
The  oontest  between stabilizing and  destabilizing forces 
The  exchange  rate  system,  like  the  human  body,  has  a  defense 
mechanism  against  routine  threats  to  the  status ~·  Hence,  extended 
illness  should  be  understood  both  in  terms  of  the  existence  and 
strength of  the  attacking  forces  and  in  terms  of  the  (relative) weakness 
of  the  defense  mechanisms.  The  offensive  and  defensive  forces  are  in 
constant  conflict,  and  illness  is  a  sign  that  the  attack  forces  are 
winning.  By  the  same  token,  the  doctor's  remedial  strategy  may  be  to 
strengthen  the  defense  or  to  impede  the  offense,  depending  on  the 
circumstances.  In  a  companion  paper  (see  note  2)  we  will suggest  that, -4-
in  the  long  run,  "preventive  medicine"  for  the  dollar  problem  is  the 
best  strategy:  apart  from  crisis  management,  policy  in  calm  periods 
should  focus  on  strengthening  the  system's  natural  defenses  against 
instability,  rather  than  trying  to  remove  or  directly  offset  the 
"causes"  of  dollar movements. 
A  "cyclical"  force  on  the  dollar  may  be  conceived  as  an  "ex 
ante"  pressure  for  change  in  its  value  (in  terms  of  foreign  exchange, 
or,  say,  in  terms  of  the  SDR)  that  is  part  of  a  self-reversing  dynamic 
process.  It denotes  an  "underlying  tendency"  for  change  that  may  or  may 
not  be  reflected  in  a  commensurate,  observed  (or  "ex post")  change.  If 
the self-reversing dynamic  process  is well  enough  understood  to  generate 
bets  on  its  future  continuation,  then  the  cyclical  force  on  the  dollar 
will  be  more  or  less  counterbalanced  by  "speculation,"  with  the  result 
that  the ~  post  movement  of  the  dollar will  be  "damped."  That  is,  the 
wave  pattern  suggested  by  the ~  ~  force  alone  will  be  transformed, 
through  the  induced  speculation  force,  such  that  its  peaks  and  troughs 
will  be  "anticipated" -- hence,  pared  down  and  filled in. 
Ex  post  cyclical  instability  of  the  dollar,  thus,  is  prima 
facie  evidence  of  inadequate  speculation.  Inadequate  speculation 
becomes  a  clear  problem  for  policy  makers  when  the  currently-observed 
value  of  the  dollar is cyclically high  (or  low).  In this situation,  the 
self-reversing  aspect  of  the  underlying  dynamic  process  virtually 
guarantees  that  the  dollar  will  fall  (or  rise)  -- in  which  case,  the 
dollar  may  be  said  to  be  "overvalued"  (or  "undervalued");  but 
speculation  does  not  prevent  the  current  situation  from  arising.  Nor, 
presumably,  will it prevent  the  reverse situation  from  developing in  the -5-
next  phase  of  the  cycle.  All  this  is  a  problem because,  inter alia, it 
leads  to waste  and  inefficiency in the use  of  real  resources  as  compared 
with  a  situation in which  expectations  about  future  price  relationships 
were  less  uncertain.  The  problem  for  society  resides  in  having  such 
expectations  about  major  currency  movements  in  the  future 
expectations  that  are  valid  but  not  (apparently)  an  adequate  basis  for 
bets. 
The  possibility of saoothing out  long cyeles 
As  the  term is usually used,  "speculation'"  connotes  very  short-
term  position-taking.  Is  it  logical  to  entertain  the  thought  of 
speculative  damping  of  cyclical  forces  whose  periodic!  ty  is  '"medium-
term,'"  say,  several years?  Yes.  The  period of  the underlying  cycles  is 
bound  to  be  much  less  important  than  the  precision  of  their measurement 
and  the  predictability  of  their  future  continuation. 
consider  an  extreme  and  fanciful  case. 
To  illustrate, 
Suppose  that  a  large  percentage  of  the  world's  asset  holders 
mysteriously  but  predictably  undergo  a  continuous  shift  of  "preference" 
from  dollar  claims  to non-dollar  claims,  and  back  again,  in a  precisely-
known  function  of  the  orbit  of  Halley's  Comet  around  the  Sun.  Thus, 
there  would  be  an  underlying  tendency  for  the  dollar  to  (say)  peak  next 
March,  and  then  to  reach  its  next  (underlying)  trough  in  38  years  --
which  is exactly half  the  period of  orbit  of Halley's  Comet. 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that  this  situation  would  present  a 
policy  problem,  once  the  facts  are  understood  and  financial  institutions -6-
have  adapted  to  the  consequent  demands.  Speculators would  demand  -- and 
national treasuries would  provide- "Halley bonds,"  which would  be  used 
as  vehicles  for  speculation  on  that  underlying  cycle.  As  the  Comet 
starts  toward  the  Sun  from  deep  space,  speculators  would  build  up  their 
long  positions  in  dollar-denominated  Halley  bonds,  the  prices  of  which 
would  tend  to  rise  as  the  Comet  moves  toward  the  Sun.  As  the  Sun  is 
approached,  speculators would  sell off  these  bonds,  taking  their profit 
on  the  appreciation,  thereby  generating  an  extra  supply  of  dollars 
counterbalancing  the  (presupposed)  cyclically-high demand  for  dollars  in 
that  phase.  Then,  as  the  Comet  heads  back  out  of  the  center  of  the 
solar  system,  speculators  would  take  up  positions  in  foreign-currency-
denominated  Halley  bonds,  using  non-dollar  currencies  that,  at  that 
stage,  would  be  in  excess  cyclical  supply.  The  result  would  tend  to  be 
smoothing  of  the  ex  ante  exchange  rate  cycle.  The  period of  cycle  would 
not  be  crucial;  Halley  bonds  would  become  favorite  vehicles  for  inter-
generational  transfers. 
In general,  if forecasts  of  "the  fundamentals"  are  sufficiently 
credible,  speculation  will  be  an  effective  stabilizer  even  if  the 
underlying cyclical process  is  slow.  If necessary,  additional  financial 
instruments  and  markets  for  trading  them  will  evolve  in  response  to  the 
demand  for  such  services.  The  primary  issue  is  not  the  speed  of  the 
autonomous  process  but  rather its predictability. 
On  the  other  hand,  accuracy  (or  small  errors)  of  forecast  of 
the  ex  po$t  exchange  rates  is  not  critical;  speculators  know  that 
forecasts  in  this  sense  can  never  be  accurate,  if  only  because  of 
competition  among  themselves.  They  don't  require  accuracy  in  this (2) 
-7-
sense.  It is  not  necessary  for  their profits,  which  depend  on  the  much 
weaker  condition  of  being  able  (usually)  to  guess  the  direction  of 
change  of  exchange  rates  (or  the direction of  deviation  from  the  forward 
rate,  if speculation is in  the  forward  market). 
The  dominance  of stabilizing forces  in the short  run 
Before  describing  the  cyclical forces  that speculation  does  not 
deal with effectively,  we  should  note  that  the  system's  defenses  against 
most  types  of  potential instability are  strong.  It must  be  judged that, 
on  the  whole,  the  current  exchange  regime  works  remarkably well. 
First,  the  system  has  the  capacity  to  respond  right  away  to 
perceived  "structural" shifts -- step  changes  that  call for  an  immediate 
realignment  of  currency  values.  Examples  would  include  the 
strengthening  of  the  dollar  right  after  the  end-' 73  oil  shock  (which 
permanently  raised  the  real  price  of  oil)  and  after  the  shift  in  U.s. 
monetary  regime  late  in  1979  (which  signaled  a  long-term  commitment  to 
the  fight  against  inflation).  A  recent  example  is  the  market  response 
to  the  announcement  of  September  22,  1985,  of  a  major  shift  in  the 
Reagan  Administration's  attitude  toward  the  issue  of  dollar 
overvaluation  and  toward  the  possible  role  of  intervention in  correcting 
it.  This  is not  to  say  that  "the  market"  gets it right  inunediately;  but 
the  rates  do  have  the  capacity  to  jump  without  much  delay,  thus  avoiding 
the  cumulative  stress  that would  be  entailed if administered  parities or 
central  rates  were  left  unchanged  unrealistically.  The  present  system 
for  determining  the  dollar's  value  is  blessedly  free  of  crises 
associated with  the  arthritic qualities  of  price-fixing institutions. -8-
The  efficiency  of  stablizing  speculation  is  most  obviously 
displayed  in  the  offsetting  of  seasonal  pressures.  Net  flows  of 
merchandise  trade,  tourism,  and  other  "real"  transactions  are  often 
highly  seasonal  and  constantly  give  rise  to  seasonal  fluctuations  in 
demands  for  foreign  exchange.  And  yet ~  post  exchange.  rates  show  no 
significant  seasonal  variation,  at  least  where  restrictions  do  not 
interfere.  The  seasonal pressures  are  accommodated  by  speculation,  most 
notably  in  the  form  of  "leads  and  lags"  on  cash  settlements  of 
commercial  transactions.  For  example,  traders with  "net  receivables"  in 
a  currency  that  is  perceived  to  be  seasonably  weak  in  a  given  period 
will  covert  their  obligations  in  that  currency  at  some  other  time, 
either  leading  or  lagging  the  time  of  accrual.  In  this  way,  seasonal 
and  speculative pressures  on  rates  are  offsetting. 
Speculation  also  is  efficient  at  financing  short-term  trade 
imbalances  -- even  those  whose  reversibility  (at  least  as  to  timing)  is 
much  less  certain than seasonal  imbalances.  For  example,  exchange  rates 
and  trade  balances  are  not  unstable  in  the  short  run,  even  though  so-
called  "J-curve  effects"  on  trade  balances  are  a  quite  normal 
phenomenon.  We  find  that,  often,  depreciation  worsens  the  terms  of 
trade,  which  in  turn  worsens  the  trade  balance  before  the  (lagged) 
volume  effects  lead  to  an  improvement  of  the  balance.  That  worsening 
probably  means  that  commercial  traders  in  the  world  at  large  are 
temporarily  holding  more  "exposure"  in  the  currency  of  that  deficit 
country.  , If  they  are  willing  to  hold  that  increased  exposure  in 
anticipation  of  the  improvement  of  the  trade  balance,  or  if  there  is 
equivalent  speculative  support  in  some  other  form  (e.g.,  forward -9-
purchases  in  advance  of  the  trade  improvement,  combined  with  interest-
arbitrage  inflows),  then  the  corresponding  currency  need  not  depreciate 
further  and  can  show  short-run  stability.  And  our  econometric  results 
do  show  that sort  of  stability. 
In  the  above  case,  stabilizing  speculation  is  assisted  by 
expectations  of  improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  What  if there  is  no 
such  help?  Efficient  financing  of  payments  imbalances  through 
speculation  requires  expectations  about  future  exchange  rates  to  adapt 
slowly  to  news  about  the  current  spot  rate  (apart  from  the  effects  on 
expectations  of  other  relevant  news).  And  this  does,  in  fact,  seem  to 
be  the  case.  Typically  it  seems  to  take  two  to  three  months  for 
exchange  rate  "surprises"  to  become  fully  incorporated  in  expectations 
of  future  rates.  Thus,  there  is  some  scope  for  spot  rates  to  adjust 
(relative  to  expectations  of  future  rates)  in  such  a  way  as  to  enlarge 
or  diminish  the  speculators'  incentive  to  hold  the  pattern  of  currency 
exposure  that  is  the  immediate  fallout  of  international  commercial 
dealings.  This  is,  of  course,  the  core  of  the  "portfolio  balance" 
explanation  of  how  spot  rates  get  determined  in  the  short  run.  This 
model  does  seem  to  fit,  and  the  resulting  estimated  processes  do  show 
good  short-run stability. 
It should  be  added,  though,  that  this stability depends  on  help 
from  the  responsiveness  of  interest  rates  (particularly,  euro-currency 
short-term  rates)  to  the  rates  of  change  in  exchange  rates.  We  find 
that  the  currency-translation  element  of  expected  yield  (on  assets 
denominated  in  a  given  currency)  has  only  a  tiny  influence  on  investors' 
currency-switching  behavior -- presumably  because  it is  so  uncertain  as -10-
compared  with  the  element  of  interest.  Thus,  it  would  take  a  large 
depreciation  in  a  spot  rate  to  generate  a  significant  speculative 
interest  in  deposits  in  that  currency,  for  a  given  set  of  interest 
rates.  But  as  the  currency  depreciates  in  response  to  a  balance-of-
payments  deficit,  the  corresponding  euro-rate  of  interest  tends  to 
rise.  And  this  rise  not  only  tends  to  limit  the  depreciation  of  the 
currency  but  attracts  deposits  into  that  currency,  hence  financing  the 
deficit.  This  process  requires,  of  course,  that  the  domestic  monetary 
policy of  the  country  concerned  be  consistent with  the  rise of  its euro-
rate,  which  implies  some  sort  of  leaning-against-the-wind  policy  of 
currency  stabilization  in  that  country.  In  our  research,  these 
processes  have  been  verified  for  non-U.S.  countries;  the  United  States 
has  not  generally  pursued  such  policies,  according  to  our  estimates, 
although there  have  apparently  been  exceptional episodes. 
In  sum,  as  we  assess  the  defenses  of  the  present  system against 
potential  instability,  the  speculative  processes  on  which  efficient 
floating  theoretically  depends  seem  alive  and  well.  Reflecting  the 
direct  intervention  of  expectations  in  the  determination  of  spot  rates 
(i.e.,  the  capacity of  rates  to  jump  to whatever  level  the  market  thinks 
is  appropriate),  exchange  rates against  the  dollar  can  conform virtually 
immediately  to  fundamental  change  in  the  outlook.  At  the  same  time,  in 
the  absence  of  such  news,  expectations  adapt  slowly  enough  to  permit 
speculative  financing  even  of  non-seasonal  payments  imbalances  in  the 
short  run, , given  that  euro-currency  rates  of  interest  on  non-dollar 
claims  also  adjust  to  limit  the  movement  in  exchange  rates  while 
reconciling  portfolio  holders'  preferences  with  the  extant  currency -II-
composition  of  net  commercial  receivables  and  other  financial  claims. 
The  international  currency  markets,  buttressed  by  exchange-stabilizing 
monetary  policies  pursued  outside  the  United  States,  must  be  considered 
a  robust  defense  against  most  forms  of  currency  instability.  Let  us, 
then,  look  at  the  "attack"  side  of  the  dollar  problem,  to  see  where  the 
challenge  to  the  system's health is  coming  from. 
The  basic uature of  the long cycle 
The  core  of  the  underlying  (ex ~)  long  cycle  of  the  dollar 
is  the  dynamic  interaction  between  the  exchange  rate  and  the  balance  of 
payments  on  current  account.  An  appreciation  of  the  dollar  (here 
expressed  as  the  exchange  rate  in  real  effective  terms)  leads 
dynamically  to  a  worsening  (algebraic  lowering)  in  the  current  balance 
of  payments,  and  this  adjustment  process  is  slow.  It  typically  takes 
about  two  years  for  a  rise  in  the  dollar  to  register  the  bulk  of  its 
effects  on  the  trade balance,  according  to  our  estimates.  And,  in turn, 
the  process  by  which  the  worsening  current  account  depresses  the  dollar 
is  slow.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  deficit  itself  (i.e.,  the 
flow)  has  little systematic effect  on  the  exchange  rate,  and  instead it 
is  the  net  external  debt  or  net  asset  position  (i.e.,  the  stock,  or the 
integral  of  the  current-account  balance)  that  finally  does  most  of  the 
job  of  bringing  the  dollar  down.  This  is what  we  find  empirically,  and 
it is  certainly consistent with  the  portfolio-balance  theory  of  exchange 
rates.  It takes  time  for  the  flow disequilibrium to  build  up  the  stock - 12-
disequilibrium  to  the  point  where  exchange  rate  adjustment  begins  to 
take place. 
And  by  that  time,  the  flow  disequilibrium -- the  trade  deficit 
is  very  big  and  will  stay  big  for  a  matter  of  years  to  come 
(reflecting  the  lags  already  mentioned).  This  in  turn  means  that  the 
stock  disequilibrium  (net  external  assets  or  debt)  will  go  on 
increasing  for  years  -- indeed,  for  so  long  as  the  current  balance 
remains  in  deficit.  Therefore,  the  effect  of  net  debt  on  the  rate  of 
change  of  the  exchange  rate  continues  for  a  long  time.  And,  of  course, 
it would  be  no  surprise to  find  that,  before  this part of  the  process  is 
over,  the  level  of  the  dollar  falls  much  below  the  level  that  would 
(after  lags)  be  consistent  with  current-account  equilibrium.  This  is 
precisely  what  we  infer  from  the  historical  record  and  what  our  model 
predicts will happen  within a  few  years  from  now. 
In  the  final  phase  of  this  long  orbit,  the  "undervaluation"  of 
the  dollar  powers  an  improvement  of  the  current  balance,  which  then 
continues  at  a  high  enough  level to normalize  the  external debt  position 
and  eventually  to  kick  the  dollar  back  into  appreciation  mode.  At  this 
point  in  time,  the  string  of  current  account  surpluses  that  are  "in the 
pipeline"  (reflecting  the  dollar's  long  undervaluation)  will  in  due 
course  generate  such  a  global  "dollar  shortage"  as  to  lead  to  another 
long  period  of  dollar  "overvaluation."  And  this  is  where  we  came  in. 
Unfortunately,  unless  the  system  changes,  the  next  period  of  dollar 
shortage wi·ll  be  much  more  violent  than  the  present  one. 
Again,  it  should  be  stressed  that  this  story  is  about ~  ante 
cyclical  forces  or  tendencies.  The  "underlying"  existence  of  this -13-
mechanism  can  be  inferred  as  likely  from  the  estimation  of  dynamic 
models,  but  ~  post  developments  will  mask  these  tendencies  via  the 
system's  defensive  mechanisms  and  policy  adaptations.  It  is  not 
possible  to  use  any  model  to  predict  ~  post  exchange  rates  with 
reasonable  accuracy. 
The  following  charts  illustrate  the  long  cycle  by  showing  AWA 
Model  predictions  of  the  dollar  exchange  rate  (against  the  SDR).  These 
are  medium-to-long  run  dynamic  forecasts  of  a  virtually-closed  model 
(underlying overall inflation rates being  the  only  exogenous  variables), 
estimated  on  data  for  1973-'83.  The  model  is  described  in  the  Annex. 
The  three  charts  differ  only  in  the  choice  of  period  of  solution,  the 
initial  conditions  being  the  actual  values  of  the  endogenous  variables 
at  end  1977,  and  1978,  and  end  1980,  respectively.  The  "actual"  series 
is also  shown  (the solid lines). 
To  appreciate  fully  the  power  of  this  long  cycle,  one  has  to 
probe  below  the  surface  of  the  estimated  dynamics  and  ask  why  these 
troublesome  lags  are  so  long.  Why,  especially,  may  turning  points  in 
the dollar  be  so  painfully delayed? 
A  co.-plication:  fiscal  destabilization  and  shifts  in  the  demand  for 
money 
Events  in  1983-84  illustrate  one  important  answer:  a  strong 
dollar  -- generated  initially  by  a  combination  of  tight  money  and  a 
cyclically-strong  trade  account  -- creates  scope  and  incentive  for  an 
expansionary  fiscal  policy  in  the  United  States  (and  adds  to  incentives J
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for  fiscal  contraction  elsewhere).  An  exceptionally  elastic  supply  of 
remove  the  curbs  that  the  rising  foreign  savings 
"conditionality" 
fiscal  measures. 
can  temporarily 
of  foreign  borrowing 
The  result  is,  in  due 
usually 
course, 
places  on  pro-growth 
higher  growth  of  final 
demand  in  the  United  States  than  elsewhere,  which  in  turn  increases  the 
global  demand  for  working  balances  in  dollars  relative  to  the  global 
demand  for  working  balances  denominated  in  other  monies.  Barring  full 
accommodation  by  the  respective  banking authorities,  the  "price"  of  U.S. 
money  is  pushed  up  (further)  relative  to  prices  of  other  monies.  That 
is,  the  dollar strengthens  further. 
Here,  the  exchange  rate  is  viewed  as  the  flow-price  of 
liquidity  (a service  flow)  denominated  in a  particular  currency.  It is 
analogous  to  the wage  rate as  an  influence  on  the  demand  for  labor.  The 
level  of  the  rate,  not  the  expected  change  in  it,  is  doing  the 
explanatory  work.  That  is,  the  exchange  rate  is  not  functioning  (in 
this  particular process)  as  an  ingredient  of  yield  on  assets,  and  hence 
this  process  is  logically  distinct  from  the  process  whereby  wealth 
redistribution  (via  current  account  imbalances)  eventually  forces 
adjustments  in  currency  values  so  as  to  satisfy  wealth-holders' 
preferences  across  currencies  of  denomination  of  assets. 
But  the  two  processes  do  become  dynamically  interwined.  What 
happens  is  that  the  U.S.  fiscal  stimulus  (and  non-U.S.  fiscal 
contraction),  by  eventually  increasing  the  relative  global  demand  for 
u.s.  money  -- as  reflected  in  net  inflows  of  monetary  capital  to  the 
U.S.  banking  system -- drives  up  the dollar and  shifts global  demand  for 
goods  and  services  from  U.S.  to  non-U.S.  output.  The  realized  effect is -15-
to  depress  the  U.S.  current  balance  (further),  counterbalancing~ post 
the  net  inflow  of  monetary  capital.  This  result  in  turn  raises  the 
external debt,  relative to what  it would  have  been without  the  divergent 
fiscal  policies.  In  short,  these  policies  act  to  delay  the  downturn  of 
the  dollar  while  increasing  the  magnitude  of  its  future  decline  by 
increasing  the  amplitude  of  the  build-up of external debt. 
The  temporary  prosperity  consequent  on  a  strong  dollar  (which 
keeps  down  inflation of  goods  prices  in dollar terms  and  which  generates 
real  U.S.  income  by  improving  the  U.S  terms  of  trade)  could  perhaps  be 
extended  so  long as u.s.  final  demand  grows  faster  than  final  demand  for 
other  countries'  goods  and  services.  This  differential  would  tend  to 
sustain  the  net  inflow of  monetary  capital to  the United States;  and  the 
upward  effect  of  this  process  on  the  dollar  might  counterbalance  for  a 
long  time  the  downward  effect  stemming  from  the  wealth  redistribution 
implied  by  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit.  To  achieve  this  result, 
the  U.S.  Government  would  probably  need  to  keep  cutting  taxes  or  let 
disbursements  rise rapidly. 
The  trouble  with  this  strategy,  of  course,  is  that  such 
measures  would  have  to  be  taken  in  larger  and  larger  amounts  over  time, 
in order  to  offset  the  ever-growing~~  effects  on  the  dollar of  the 
external  debt  (which  would  keep  growing  since  the  current  account  would 
stay  in  deficit).  Eventually,  global  portfolio  preferences  would  be 
binding.  That  is,  eventually,  erosion  of  the  U.S.  ability  to  borrow 
abroad  mus~ reduce  the  relative  growth  of  U.S.  final  demand  (by  driving 
up  interest  rates  in  dollar  terms).  At  this  point,  the  real 
underpinnings  of  the  net  inflow  of  monetary  capital  would  be  shot  away, - 16-
while,  simultaneously,  the  extant  debt  and  deficit  positions  would  be 
much  worse  than  they  would  have  been  without  the  tax  cuts,  or  spending 
increases.  At  this  point  the  dollar would  tend  to  be  realigned quickly; 
but  of  course  the  changes  in  exchange  rates  that  one  might  actually 
observe  under  those  circumstances  would  be  even  less  predictable  than 
usual,  while  the  shock  to  global  economic  activity  would  similarly  be 
incalculable.  This  is  the  situation  that  we  are  entering  now,  in 
October  1985. 
The  moral  of  this  story  is  that,  if  the  U.S.  Government's 
planning  horizon  is  not  long,  it  has  powerful  incentives  to  pursue 
policies  that  are  indeed  destabilizing.  For  instance,  if  Congress 
somehow  had  inside  information  that  Doomsday  was  unalterably  scheduled 
for  1990,  they  probably  would  be  well  advised  to  go  for  sustained  high 
growth  through  fiscal  stimulus.  This  is  not  to  say,  of 
under  the  floating-dollar  regime  fiscal  policies 
course, 
have 
that 
been 
systematically  destabilizing.  There  is  probably  nothing  systematic 
about  u.s.  fiscal  policy.  Indeed,  in  the  1978  dollar-undervaluation 
period,  relatively  expansionary  fiscal  policies  in  the  United  States 
probably  tended  to  support  the  demand  for  dollars,  hence  limiting  its 
decline.  The  policy  response  to  that  crisis  was  not  to  raise  taxes 
(which  arguably  would  have  depressed  the  dollar  further  by  easing 
conditions  in  the  global  dollar  market)  but  rather  by  tightening 
monetary  conditions  from  the  supply  side.  And,  naturally,  that  response 
did  the  tr:Lck. -17-
Other difficulties around  turning points 
The  recitation of  the  factors  influencing  the  long  cycle  of  the 
dollar would  be  incomplete without mention  of  "speculative  bubbles,"  the 
"safe  haven"  argument,  and  shifts  in  asset  preferences  more  generally. 
Although  the  modeling  work  drawn  on  in  this  paper  gives  no  quantitative 
clues  as  to  the  importance  of  these  factors,  more  specialized  studies 
have  pointed to  their significance.31  Certainly,  from  close observation 
of  exchange  market  behavior  and  of  news  commentary  during  the  months 
leading  up  to  November  1978  and  February  1985,  one  would  reasonably 
surmise  that  swings  in  "sentiment"  about  the  dollar  can  be  huge,  and 
that  most  investors  do  not  see  their  own  views  at  such  times  as  being 
passing  intellectual  or  emotional  fads.  By  October  1978  the  popular 
view  had  developed  that  the  dollar-centered  system was  being  permanently 
replaced  by  a  multi  -polar  reserve  system  that  would  be  reflected  in  a 
major  and  lasting  decline  in  the  dollar's  role  in  private  portfolios. 
On  the  other  hand,  by  February  1985,  the  view  was  that  investing  in 
"U.S.  Inc."  was  the  only  game  worth playing-- apparently  reflecting  the 
popular  opinion  that  the  United  States  had  discovered  the  Fountain  of 
Eternal  Growth.  At  that  point  the  U.S.  economy  was  about  seven  months 
into  a  year  of  only  2  percent  growth,  but  that  fact  was  not  yet  known. 
The  bubble  apparently burst when  people  got  a  fuller picture of what  was 
really going  on. 
Fr.om  the  standpoint  of  analyzing  "the  dollar  problem"  as  it is 
conceived  in this  paper,  the  important  points  about  these  psycho-dynamic 
phenomena  are  these:  they  tend  to  be  piggy-backed  on  the  fundamental -18-
cyclical forces,  and  they  make  exchange  rates  even  less  predictable  from 
a  speculator's standpoint  than  they would  otherwise  be. 
It's  hard  to  believe  that  shifts  in  "sentiment"  would  be 
quantitatively  important  if it weren't  for  more  fundamental  sources  of 
cyclical  instability.  One  casually  observes  that  really  outlandish 
views  about  the dollar outlook normally become  pervasive  only in periods 
when  currencies  are  (or  are  becoming)  way  out  of  line  from  any 
reasonable  measure  of  fundamental  equilibrium  rates.  (There  was,  for 
example,  the  "permanent  levitation"  theory of  early  1985).  But  when  the 
dollar  does  get  way  out  of  line,  the  power  of  market  psychodynamics  to 
push  it  even  further  out  of  line,  or  at  least  to  delay  basic  turning 
points,  should not  be  underestimated. 
This  observation  ties  in  with  a  second  one  -- that  it becomes 
much  riskier  to  bet  on  turning  points  being  reached,  within  a  given 
horizon,  if  "bubbles"  and  things  are  about.  In  normal  or  average  times 
(by which  we  mean  over  our  sample  period  taken as  a  whole),  expectations 
appear  to  be  revised  by  less,  over  given  short  intervals,  than  spot 
rates  themselves  move.  This  provides  a  basis  for  speculation  to  be 
stabilizing  in  normal  times  (as  already  pointed  out).  Whether  this  is 
true  around  long-term  cyclical  peaks  or  troughs  of  the  dollar  is 
doubtful,  at  best.  The  volatility of  spot  rates  during  1985  (which  may 
well  have  encompassed  such  a  basic  turning  point)  suggests  that 
speculation becomes  less  stablizing around  such  extremes. 
To,  sum  up  this  section:  we  find  from  model  estimation  and 
analysis  that  the  "attack  forces"  against  long-run  stability  of  the 
dollar  are  formidable.  These  forces  reflect  how  commercial  and - 19-
financial  business  evolves  dynamically  in  private  sectors;  they  are  not 
policy-produced.  The  kicker  on  the  up  side.  though,  is  the  short-run 
fiscal  incentive  for  the  United  States  to  go  for  growth  when  the  dollar 
is  strong,  which  adds  to  the  dollar  problem  because  under  this 
circumstance  net  capital  inflows  dominate  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments 
in  the  short  run.  For  political  r.easons,  there  presumeably  is  not  a 
fully-symmetric  danger  of  U.S.  fiscal  contraction  when  the  dollar  is 
weak.  Finally,  the  cyclical  forces  for  instability  are  probably 
aggravated  somewhat  by  speculative bubbles  and  other whimsical  shifts in 
investor sentiment  that  may  become  important  when  the  dollar  is far  from 
equilibrium. 
Weakness  of Defenses  against  long-term instability 
We  should  now  return  to  the  "defense"  side  of  the  system  and 
investigate  further  the  issue  of  why  it seems  relatively weak,  when  set 
against  the  dangers  just  outlined.  As  already  argued  (in  the  Halley's 
Comet  example),  the  first  line  of  defense  is  private  speculation.  The 
second  line is monetary  policy,  which will be  considered  later. 
Ten  years  ago  there  was  still a  strong  following  for  the  view 
that  private  forecasting  could  show  people  with  money  how  to  bet,  so 
that  they  would  sell  overvalued  currencies  and  buy  undervalued  ones. 
Economic  reasoning,  with  or  without  benefit  of  econometrics,  was 
supposed  to  be  the  method.  Now,  by  1985,  that  view  has  been  virtually 
laid to  rest.  Forecasts  of  exchange  rates  based  on  even  the  best  models 
of  "the  fundamentals"  simply  are  not  very  credible as  a  basis  for  market (4) 
-20-
operations.  This  is  the  proximate  "cause"  of  the  dollar  problem,  and 
probably  the  key  to its cure. 
What  is  the  evidence  that  exchange  rate  forecasts  do  not 
matter?  As  part  of  the  AWA  Model,  we  estimate  the  relative influence  on 
portfolio  switching  (among  currencies)  of  the  interest  rate  payable  on 
an  asset  and  the  expected  capital  gain  (or  loss)  due  to  the  expected 
change  in  the  exchange  rate  (over  the  comparable  period)  for  the 
currency  in  which  that  asset  is  denominated.  For  a  given  number  of 
points  of  expected  yield  over  a  given  interval,  the  interest  element 
gets  about  13  times  as  much  weight  (in  motivating  portfolio-switching 
behavior)  as  the  exchange  rate  factor,  presumably  because  the  latter is 
so  uncertain.  In  other  words,  the  contribution  of  the  exchange  rate 
forecast  to  the  evaluation  of  overall  yield  gets  discounted  by  a  factor 
of  13.  This  estimate  is up  considerably  from  what  it used  to  be  several 
years  ago,  when  we  were  using  a  sample  period  limited  to  the  1970's.  A 
few  years  ago  our  estimate of  this  factor was  much  lower. 
The  virtual irrelevance of aodels  to market  operations 
It  is  no  wonder  that  forecasts  are  thus  discounted  when  one 
reads  the  famous  Meese-Rogoff  research  and  finds  that  the  spot  rate, 
taken  as  a  forecaster,  usually  does  less  badly  at  predicting  future 
exchange  rates  than  a  fair  sample  of  econometric  models -- even when  the 
true  values.  of  any  exogenous  variables  in  those  models  (which  of  course 
would  not  be  known  ~  ante)  are  used. 4/  In  other  words,  when  several 
simple,  standard  economic  models  of  exchange  rates  are  estimated  for -21-
various  sample  periods,  using  only  the  data  base  that  would  have  been 
available  to  the  forecaster  at  the  time  he  makes  his  forecast,  and  even 
assuming  that  he  correctly  predicts  his  exogenous  variables,  he  still 
does  not  do  better in  terms  of  accuracy  than he  would  do  if he  just took 
the  current  spot  rate  as  his  forecast.  If  this  is  so,  why  would  any 
investor  pay  for  a  model  forecast  or even  bother his  head  with difficult 
economic  reasoning?  And,  in fact,  few  of  them  do. 
Econometricians  should  not  feel  badly  about  the  Meese-Rogoff 
results because,  after all,  theory  tells us  that  the  spot  rate should  be 
an  extremely  good  forecaster.  It  immediately  reflects  the  balances 
between  huge  amounts  of  demands  and  supplies  for  various  monies. 
Furthermore,  both  the  spot  rate  and  model  forecasts  tend  to  outperform 
the  forward  rate  (as  a  forecaster  of  the  future  spot  rate).  Thts 
suggests  that  neither  the  spot  rate  nor  the  models  are  biased 
forecasters,  whereas  the  forward  rate  is biased.  One  should  expect  the 
forward  rate  to  be  a  biased  forecaster  (biased  by  interest  rate 
differentials  and  the  power  of  covered  arbitrage)  unless  forward-market 
speculation  is  extremely  responsive  to  deviations  of  the  forward  rate 
from  the  expected  future  spot  rate.  And  since  the  latter expectation is 
not  generally  held with  enough  confidence  to  bet  on,  this  responsiveness 
is  low.  Expectations  about  the underlying  cycle  do  not  forcefully  guide 
the  forward  rate,  so  it  is  no  surprise  that  they  do  not  guide  the  spot 
rate either. 
The  fact  that  the  spot  rate  outperforms  the  forward  rate 
(because  the  latter  is  biased)  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  speculative 
profits  (since  there  exists  a  better-than-even  chance  of  making  a -22-
profit  gross  of  transactions  costs,  from  buying  forward  when  the  spot 
rate  exceeds  the  forward  rate,  or  from  selling  forward  when  the  spot 
rate is  lower  than  the  forward  rate).  It keeps  the  speculative activity 
alive  in  the  forward  markets  and  helps  to  generate  the  necessary balance 
for  what  commercial  traders,  hedgers,  and  arbitragers  want  to  do. 
Speculative  activity  performs  its  economic  function  reasonably  well 
without benefit of  economic  models. 
Recently,  some  portfolio  optimization  routines,  designed  to 
assist  futures-market  speculators  on  the  Chicago  IMM,  have  expressed  the 
forecast  of  the  future  spot  rate  as  a  weighted  function  of  the  present 
spot  rate  (and  other  current  financial  price  data)  and  of  a  forecast 
based  on  economic  fundamentals;  the  weight  attaching  to  the  latter  is 
itself  calculated  so  as  to  optimize  the  assumed  objective  function, 
given  the  model's  track  record.  Various  economic  models  have  been 
tried.  The  weight  they  get  in this  optimization  routine  averages  around 
5  percent.  This  is  a  pretty  good  indicator  of  the  strength  of  the 
linkage  between  economically-based  expectations  of  exchange  rates  and 
current  market  operations.5/ 
In  short,  speculative  activity  is  performing  its  function  but 
does  not  get  much  help  from  economic  models.  That  this  is  true  can  be 
corroborated  by  checking  with  major  commercial  and  banking 
establishments  that  would,  in  principle,  have  the  greatest  interest. 
There  are  some  model-based  exchange  rate  services,  many  of  which  sprang 
up  in  the  J.970's,  but  they  are  struggling  for  survival,  and  the  high-
growth  area  of  their  business  tends  to  be  in  developing  "technical" 
trading  strategies  that  are  at  least  as  likely  to  be  destabilizing  as -23-
stabilizing in their economic effect.  If people  thought  there was  money 
to  be  made  in  developing  state-of-the-art  exchange  rate  models,  immense 
R  &  D  resources  would  be  pouring  into  the  effort.  But,  if  anything, 
this  effort is  now  declining. 
One  can  agonize  at  length  over  why  models  do  not  do  well.  The 
reasons  are  well  known.  There  is  no  particular  reason  to  believe  that 
the  key  functions  of  the  models  are  at  all  constant  over  time,  as  is 
formally  assumed  in  the  estimation of  them.  Certainly,  policy  responses 
do  not  lend  themselves  readily  to  this  assumption  of  constancy,  and 
private  reactions  are  complex  functions  of  private  expectations  about 
official behavior.  In short-run forecasting,  economic  models  always  get 
it wrong  because,  by  definition,  they  cannot  anticipate  "news",  and  a 
key  feature  of  the  floating  dollar  is  that  it  does  respond  immediately 
to  news  (though  often  in  ways  that  seem  capricious).  Even  if  economic 
forecasts  of  rates  at  some  horizon  date  had  a  good  degree  of  accuracy, 
any  position  taken  on  the  basis  of  that  forecast  would  have  a  high 
probability  of  being  wrong  in  the  shorter  run  -- generating  a  large 
unrealized  loss  before  that  horizon  date was  reached. 
As  for  forecasting  to  long  horizon  dates  -- as  might  be 
particularly relevant  to  the  sort  of  anticipatory  action  needed  to  deal 
with  cyclical  instabilities  the  problem  that  one  may  naturally 
encounter  is  that  the  instability of  the  model  itself  (which  may  have  a 
valid  basis  in  fact)  may  lead  to  highly-improbable  forecasts.  The 
analyst  judgmentally  expects  parametric  changes  to  occur  over  that  long 
period,  even  though  they  are  not  allowed  for  in  the  estimation  of  the 
model  itself.  Whatever  merit  there  may  be  in  the  model  for  diagnostic -24-
purposes,  its  long-term forecasts  truly  lack  credibility  and  (probably) 
accuracy. 
The  silver lining for private forecasters 
A point  of  satisfaction for  the  economic  forecaster,  though,  is 
that  the  model  may  still do  well  in  calling  the  long-term direction  of 
changes  correctly.  It  is  significant  that  models  generally  do  much 
better  on  predicting  direction  of  change  than  on  accuracy  (say,  as 
measured  by  root  mean  squared  errors).6/  One  can  say,  often,  that  the 
dollar  is  likely  to  go  in  a  certain  direction,  based  on  the 
fundamentals,  sometime  during  a  broadly-specified  future  period.  But 
the  exact  process  that  will  start  and  stop  its movement,  and  the  level 
it will  stop  at,  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  historical  record  or  from 
one's  theoretical  framework.  The  evidence  of  some  success  in predicting 
direction of  change  over  lengthy  periods  does  suggest  the  possibility of 
encouraging  countercyclical  speculation  if  the  risks  of  short-term 
losses  could  be  adequately  reduced.  Under  present  arrangements,  these 
risks  seem  to  be  too  high  to expect  cyclical instability to  be  damped  in 
this  way,  but  obviously  the  situation  would  be  very  different  if  the 
authorities  themselves  took  an  open  position  on  the  levels  of 
fundamental  equilibrium exchange  rates.2/ 
In brief,  then,  a  model  may  well  be  good  enough  to  diagnose  the 
qualitative nature  of  the  dollar  problem  but  still not  accurate  enough 
to  provide  a  credible  basis  for  action  that  would  be  stabilizing,  given 
the  policy  environment.  Despite  the  ever-growing  sample  period  that  is -25-
relevant  for  estimation  of  the  dynamics  of  the  dollar  float,  learning 
that  would  be  constructive  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  is not  taking 
place  at  any  perceptible  speed.  During  the  last  few  years,  instead,  we 
have  learned  mostly  about  why  constructive  learning  cannot  occur.  We 
have  accumulated  both  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  for  the 
inconstancy,  instability,  and  indeed  the  indeterminancy  of  exchange  rate 
relationships. 
In  the  popular  press,  and  then  in  the  U.S.  Government,  a  near-
consensus  was  forged  that  the  dollar  became  grossly  overvalued  by  early 
1985,  while  at  the  same  time  the  financial  markets  grew  to  accept  the 
idea  that  a  view  of  the  economic  fundamentals  is  practically irrelevant 
to  actual  currency  operations.  That  really  is  the  point  that  deserves 
to  be  focussed  on,  in  the  discussion  of  whether  and  how  to  improve 
currency  arrangements. 
Monetary  policy as  a  limited stabilizer 
The  second  line  of  defense  against  dollar  instability  is 
monetary  policy.  What  we  can  verify  with  dynamic  models  is  that 
monetary  policy -- especially  as  conducted  outside  the  United  States --
restricts  or  stabilizes  the  rate  of  change  of  the  dollar  but  not  its 
level.  This  follows  from  our  finding  that it is  the  expected  yield  on 
assets  (and  its  change)  that  is  the  external  target  of  monetary 
stabilizati,on  policies  outside  the  United  States.  (Some  evidence  for 
these  assertions  will  be  found  in  the  Annex,  especially  Section  B  and 
the  estimates  given  in  Section  E.)  But  even  complete  stabilization of -26-
yields  (including  rates  of  capital  gain  or  loss  from  currency 
translation)  would  not  prevent  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  from 
drifting way  off  base  in  the  long  run. 
The  level  of  the  exchange  rate  is  of  course  restricted  in  the 
long  run  by  the  fact  that  it  controls  the  international  competitive 
position  in  markets  for  goods  and  services.  This  is  true  given  that 
domestic  monetary  aggregates  are  fundamentally  controlled  in  all  the 
major  countries  by  the  respective  central  banks,  and  the  trend  rates  of 
change  in  these  aggregates  determine  the  trend  rates  of  change  of  the 
respective  domestic  price  levels  in  terms  of  local  currency.  But  the 
long-run  restriction  on  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  that  is  thus 
implied  by  the  long-run  need  to  retain  international  competitiveness 
does  not  preclude,  either logically or empirically,  explosive  cycles. 
But  how  do  we  know  that  relative  purchasing  power  parity  does 
not  tend  to  be  maintained  continuously,  thus  placing  a  short-to-medium-
run  restriction  on  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  (given  the  tracks  of 
the  monetary  aggregates)?  To  the  extent  that  such  a  PPP-force  might 
prevail,  it would  provide  a  channel  for  automatic  stabilization  of  the 
exchange  rate  level  that was  independent  of  the  slow  adjustment  speed  on 
trade  and  the  stock-flow  factors  that  pose  the  threat  of  instability. 
More  specifically,  if given inflation differentials were  continously and 
fully  incorporated  into  expected  changes  in  exchange  rates,  and  hence 
into  spot  rate  trends  (via  the  tendency  toward  portfolio  balance),  the 
occasional .need  for  exchange  rates  to adjust  by  large  amounts  to correct 
already-large  disequilibrium  in  competitive  positions  might  be 
reduced.  And,  presumably,  this would  militate against  big deviations  of -27-
observed  spot  rates  from  their underlying  trends  continously  satisfying 
PPP. 
We  have  measured  this  continuous  force  toward  PPP; 
unfortunately it is  very  small  and  not  significant statistically.  (This 
is  the  parameter  w  in  the  AWA  Model,  discussed  in  the  Annex.) 
Moreover,  this  force  has  apparently  been  declining  over  time  -- perhaps 
as  investors  have  learned  to  ignore  it.  But  our  model  estimation  does 
corroborate  the  view  that  there  is  a  trade-off  between  the  strength of 
the  continuous  PPP  force  and  the  strength  of  the  cyclical  process 
whereby  price  competitiveness  eventually gets  adjusted  through  swings  in 
trade  balances,  external  debt,  and  exchange  rates.  (The  evidence  of 
such  a  trade-off  is  that  the  estimates  of  the  parameters  governing  the 
two  processes,  particularly  the  parameter  w versus  the  parameters  a1  , 
in  the  AWA  Model,  tend  to  move  in opposite  directions,  given  changes  in 
data  or  specification.)  This  suggests  that,  if  the  PPP  force  could  be 
strengthened  as  a  matter  of  policy,  the  forces  for  instability would  be 
weakened. 
The  main  point  here  is  that,  even  if  the  monetary  authorities 
of  the  major  countries  controlled  domestic  inflation  and  stabilized 
expected  rates  of  change  in  exchange  rates  against  the  dollar,  they 
would  not  be  doing  enough  to  give  speculators  the  pegs  they  need  (and 
that  the  system  needs)  to  keep  things  reasonably  stable.  Information 
about  what  the  levels  of  the  rates  ought  to  be,  of  significance  to 
market  operators,  must  somehow  be  supplied  in  order  to  make  a  real 
difference  to  the  system's  behavior. (5) 
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Bow  to empower  aonetary policy as  a  stabilizer 
The  question  of  how  to  get  such  information  on  exchange  rate 
levels  can  be  answered  -- not  precisely  and  unambiguously,  but  well 
enough  to  contribute  to  better  performance  of  the  system  in  the 
future.  Roughly  speaking,  one  needs  to  calculate  the  underlying  trend 
levels  of  exchange  rates  that  are  consistent  with  PPP  or with some  more 
general  concept  of  fundamental  equilibrium.  7 I  Any  dynamic  model  used 
for  diagnostic  purposes  may  (but  does  not  necessarily)  have  a  steady-
state  solution  for  all  the  endogenous  variables  and  for  the  exchange 
rate  levels  in particular.  If  it  does,  the  steady-state level of  each 
exchange  rate  will  be  a  particular  function  of  the  estimated  constants 
and  parameters  of  the  model  and  of  the  levels  of  the  exogenous  variables 
(e.g.,  the  trend  levels  of  domestic  prices  or  money  stocks).  The  rates 
of  change  in  these  "fundamental  equilibrium exchange  rates"  (FEERs)  will 
normally  be  particular functions  of  the  rates  of  change  in  the  exogenous 
variables.  Appearing  in these  functions  will be  estimated  parameters  of 
the model. 
It would  be  legitimate  and  interesting  to  calculate  FEERs  in  a 
variety  of  models.  For  purposes  of  such  research  we  should  define  the 
class  of  models  that  are  relevant.  To  serve  the  purpose  at  hand  the 
model  should ideally: 
(1)  have  a  well-defined steady state; 
(2)  go  as  far  as  the  state  of  the  art  allows  to  specify realistic 
dynamics; -29-
(3)  handle  stabilization  policies  as  endogenous  functions,  if  that 
is  an  empirically  valid  characterization  of  these  policies; 
more  generally,  avoid  including  exogenous  variables  that  in 
reality are  interdependent  with  exchange  rates; 
(4)  be  estimated  consistently. 
The  desirability  of  (1)  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  steady  state  is 
the  simplest  and  perhaps  the  most  "objective"  way  to  define  fundamental 
equilibrium.  Criterion  (2)  is needed  to  maximize  the  credibility of  the 
policy  strategy  in  the  eyes  of  market  operators.  Criterion  (3)  is 
necessary  to  avoid  begging  the  question.  Any  calculated  FEERs  will 
depend  on  the  levels  of  variables  treated as  exogenous  in  the  model,  and 
if  these  variables  are  in  reality  interdependent  with  exchange  ratea, 
then  the  question  of  their  steady-state  levels  would  need  to  be 
addressed.  And  the  only  satisfactory  way  to  do  this  is  to  endogenize 
these  variables  in  the  model.  This  may  well  mean  that  fully 
satisfactory  models 
"time".  Criterion 
will  have  no  exogenous  variables,  apart  from 
(4)  is  needed  for  accuracy  and  credibility;  in 
practice  it  probably  means  estimation  of  the  entire  system  in one  shot 
by  Full  Information Maximum  Likelihood. 
To  the  extent  that  these  criteria conflict  (e.g.,  completeness 
of  specification  versus  consistency  of  estimation),  a  balanced  package 
must  be  the  aim.  Judgments  will  differ,  of  course,  on  the  trade-offs 
encountereq  in  balancing  these  criteria,  and  no  one  model  may  emerge  as 
uniquely  more  useful  than  some  others.  On  the  other  hand,  any  model 
that  does  well  in  satisfying all four  criteria will  be  an  adequate  tool -30-
for  the  purpose,  in  this  author's  opinion.  FEERs  generated  by  all such 
models will probably  be  closely clustered,  relative  to  the deviations  of 
spot  rates  from  the  FEERs  that  we  have  been  seeing  and  that  we  are 
likely  to  see  in  coming  years,  if  the  system's  behavior  is  not 
qualitatively  improved.  At  the  present  state  of  research,  this 
assertion  is  no  better  than  an  informed  guess,  and  it  would  seem 
important  to gather  evidence  supporting or  contradicting it. 
If this  view  is  correct,  there is no  need  to  use  just one  model 
and  to  ignore  others.  Moreover,  any  such  model  should  be  re-estimated 
periodically  in  order  to  keep  the  parameter  estimates  consistent  with 
the  full  information  set  available.  Such  updating  is  very  unlikely  to 
shift  the  FEERs  substantially over  short  periods,  but  over  long  periods 
the  updating of  estimates will help  to  keep  abreast  of  changing  trends. 
A  major  purpose  of  the  FEERs  is  to  encourage  counter-cyclical 
(hence,  stabilizing)  speculation  by  reducing  the  risk  of  betting  on  the 
depreciation  of  overvalued  rates  and  on  the  appreciation  of  undervalued 
rates.  The  idea  is  thus  to  strengthen  a  process  that  is  already 
operating  (as  we  have  noted)  but  that  happens  to  be  too  weak  to  be 
effective,  given  the  virulence  of  the  "attack forces"  in the  system. 
Implicit  in  this  proposal  is  that  monetary  authorities 
calculate  FEERs,  and  publish  them  (or  else  publish  the  method  of  their 
calculation  with  sufficient  precision  so  that  others  can  do  the 
calculation),  and  hence  endorse  the  estimates.  In  this  sense,  the 
monetary  aathorities  need  to  "take  a  position"  on  exchange  rates,  which 
naturally  means  that  they  need  to  take  some  risk  (at  least  in  a 
political sense). -31-
Moreover,  to  reduce  the  private  risk  of  countercyclical 
speculation,  it  is  necessary  that  the  monetary  authorities  give  some 
weight  to  deviations  of  spot  rates  from  FEERs  -- that  is,  other  things 
being equal,  to  ease  monetary  conditions when  the  currency is overvalued 
and  to tighten  them  when  the  currency is undervalued. 
The  most  efficient  and  direct  way  to  do  this  would  be  through 
forward-market  operations:  the  authority  would  be  prepared  to  buy  its 
currency  forward  when  undervalued,  for  instance;  this  would  be  seen  by 
private  traders  as  an  expression  of  official  intent  to  tighten  during 
the  period  of  the  forward  contract.  If these  intentions were  made  good, 
the  effect  would  tend  to  be  profits  for  the  authority,  and  the  private 
incentive  would  thus  be  to  compete  for  these  profits  by  anticipating 
official action in the  forward  markets. 
This  _strategy  would  be  an  efficient  way  to  accomplish  the 
objective  because  it  should  minimize  actual  changes  in official  balance 
sheets.  In  principle,  it  could  tend  toward  a  pure  signaling  system, 
with  private  traders  calculating  the  FEERs  in advance,  anticipating  the 
likely  official  action,  and  hence  themselves  driving  the  spot  rate 
sufficiently close  to  the  FEER.  Ultimately,  the  gravitational  force  of 
the  FEER  on  the  spot  rate  would  naturally  depend  on  the  weight  that 
deviations  (of  the  spot  rate  from  the  FEER)  would  get, ~  ante,  in  the 
conduct  of  monetary  policy,  as  this  policy  is  perceived  by  private 
operators. 
Focusing  official  use  of  FEERs  on  forward  operations  would  be 
the  most  direct  way  to  buttress  private  speculation,  because  then  the 
authority  could  take  a  position  on  the  speed  of  intended  adjustment. (6) 
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Forecasting  with  the  estimated  models  should  give  some  notion  of  the 
time  it  is  likely  to  take  for  the  spot  rate  to  return  to  the  steady-
state  level.  Now,  as  we  have  stated,  these  forecasts  are  not  very 
accurate,  but  the  direction  is usually  right,  and  the  models  supply  the 
best  evidence  that  exists  about  the  relevant  speeds  of  adjustment.  So 
the  authority  should  take  these  estimated  dynamics  into  account  when 
selecting  the  markets  in  which  to  operate.  To  the  extent  feasible 
(which  at present,  admittedly,  is not  great),  the  authority should  avoid 
making  forward  bets  that  would  appear  to  assume  an  unrealistically fast 
adjustment  of  the  spot  rate,  taking  into  account  the  speeds  of 
adjustment  of  supporting  policies.  In  this  way  the  authority  could 
exercise  the  most  direct  sort  of  leadership  of  the  private  process  of 
stabilizing speculation. 
In  sum,  if it is  possible  to  use  a  dynamic  model  to understand 
the  disequilibrium  of  the  exchange  rate  and  related  variables,  and  on 
this basis  to  diagnose  the dollar  problem,  then it should  be  possible  to 
use  that  same  model  to  compute  an  equilibrium path for  that  rate  through 
time.  A  relatively  simple  measure  of  such  paths  would  be  the 
mathematical  steady  state  of  the  model,  if it exists.  There will  never 
be  a  uniquely  satisfactory model,  nor,  therefore,  a  uniquely  acceptable 
equilibrium path.  But  that  fact  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility that 
the  general  approach  may  be  useful. 
The  steady-state  vector  of  the  various  exchange  rates  at  any 
time  (like•the present)  can  be  viewed  as  a  complex  transformation  of  the 
relevant  body  of  historical  data  -- a  transformation  that,  though 
perhaps  complicated,  can  enter  the  domain  of  public  opinion  and  become -33-
part  of  the  state  of  data  to  which  portfolio  managers  respond  through 
time.  Once  that  happens,  and  once  monetary  policies  themselves  begin  to 
respond  to  deviations  of  spot  rates  from  "FEERs,"  exchange  rate 
fluctuations  will  become  damped,  as  diagnosed  by  the  models.  That  is, 
as  it becomes  possible  to  estimate  the  models  on  the  basis  of  data  for 
the  period  over  which  FEERs  were  calculated  and  used,  the  model's 
estimated  parameters  will  incorporate  the  effects  of  that  damping,  and 
the  formal  stability analysis  of  the  model  will reflect  those effects. 
The  amount  of  damping  of  course  depends  on  the  weight  that  the 
author!  ties  are  prepared  to  give  to  deviations  from  FEERs  in  running 
their  overall  stabilization  policy.  The  analyst  cannot  presume  to  say 
what  this weight  should  be.  All  he  can  say  is that  this is  the  lever to 
use.  And  when  it  comes  to  preferences,  it  looks  like  there  would  be 
wide  agreement  now  that  this  weight  should  be  greater  than  its  recent 
historical value  of  near-zero. 
Conclusion 
The  monetary  authorities  constitute  the  second  line  of  defense 
against  cyclical  instability  of  the  dollar,  but  they  have  been 
ineffective  in  this  defense  because  they  have  not  been  able  or -willing 
to  convey  to  the  marketplace  any  sense  of  what  the  levels  of  exchange 
rates  ought  to  be.  So  private  risk  assessments  have  not  been  strongly 
related  to~  deviations  of  spot  rates  from  any  measure  of  fundamental 
equilibrium  (such  as  the  steady  state  of  an  appropriate  model).  Thus, -34-
the  forces  tending  toward  cyclical  instability of  the  dollar  float  have 
not  been  substantially  curbed  by  any  official  commitment  to stability as 
a  goal  of  policy. 
How  can  one  explain  the  failure  of  monetary  policies  to  deal 
with  the  dollar  problem?  An  explanation  is  not  hard  to  find.  The  tools 
of  disequilibrium  dynamics  are  not  yet  familiar  to  most  people  in 
positions  of  influence.  Although  most  people  naturally  think  in 
disequilibrium  terms  when  they  read  the  newspaper,  the  intellectual 
tools  for  most  of  the  academic  discussion  of  exchange  rate  management 
are  the  tools  of  static  equilibrium  analysis.  A  discrete  "shock" 
somehow  materializes  exogenously,  and  the  authorities  are  meant  to  see 
it  and  offset  its  effects,  in  the  process  optimizing  their  social 
welfare  functions.  This  sort  of  analysis  has  proved  to  be  sterile,  for 
reasons  that  should  be  obvious  by  now. 8/ 
On  the  other hand,  the  theoretical attack  on  this  approach  that 
draws  its  inspiration  from  efficient-market  theory  has  been 
paralyzing.  The  practical  thrust  of  its  message  is  that  there  can't  be 
a  dollar  problem,  and  even  if  there  were  one,  nothing  could  be  done 
about  it.  Although  correctly  pointing  to  the  difficulties  of  drawing 
valid  and  useful  conclusions  for  monetary  policy  from  older  styles  of 
analysis,  the efficient-market  intelligensia has  not  produced  a  coherent 
policy  strategy  for  dealing  with  problems  of  near-efficiency  in  the 
foreign  exchange  markets. 
The  u  .. S.  Administration  now  recognizes  the  need  for  active 
official involvement  in correcting  the  dollar overvaluation  that  emerged 
during  1981-85,  but  it has  apparently  not  yet  understood  the  structural -35-
nature  of  the  problem  nor  what  to  do  about  it.  As  yet  (December  1985) 
there  has  been  no  hint  of  a  commitment  to  a  workable  policy  of  dollar 
stabilization  that  would  be  consistent  with  a  return  to  a  tenable 
balance  in  the  world  economy.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  official 
move  to drive  the dollar  down  (commencing  with  the Group-of-Five  meeting 
of  September  22,  1985)  may  well  inaugurate  the  next  great  phase  of 
dollar undervaluation. 
A  vital  first  step  has  been  taken:  the  U.S.  Government  has 
recognized  that  the  monetary  authorities  need  to  take  some  sort  of 
policy  position  regarding  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate.  An  official 
clarification and  articulation of  that  policy position is  now  needed,  in 
order  to  successfully  manage  the  risks  that  the  world  economy  faces  in 
1986  and  in the  following years. -36-
Notes 
1/  Econometric  evidence  is  provided  in  the  Annex  to  this  paper 
which  documents  the  AWA  Exchange  Rate  Model.  The  estimation  and 
analysis  reported  in  that  Annex  was  based  on  data  through  September 
1983.  More  recently,  re-estimation  including  data  through  1984  has,  as 
expected,  strengthened  the  case  made  in  the  main  text  of  this  paper. 
That  is,  in  several  key  respects,  estimates  of  parameters  contributing 
to  the  long-run  cyclical  instability  of  the  system  were  revised  upward 
or  became  more  significant  statistically.  Throughout  this  paper, 
assertions  about  the  functioning  of  the  system  are  generally  based  on 
the  AWA  Model  research -- often  the  reference  being  to  some  particular 
aspect  of  the  model  specification or  parametric  estimate. 
2/  See  Paul  Armington,  "Equilibrium  Exchange  Rates 
Return  to Balance  in the World  Economy"  (forthcoming). 
and  the 
3/  See,  for  instance,  Wing  T.  Woo,  "Speculative  Bubbles  in  the 
Foreign  Exchange  Markets,"  Brookings  Discussion  Papers  in  International 
Economics,  No.  13,  March  1984. 
4/  The  latest  in  this  line  of  research  is  Richard  Meese  and 
Kenneth  Rogoff,  "Was  It  Real?  The  Exchange  Rate-Interest  Differential 
Relation;  1983-1984"  (mimeo).  Or  earlier,  by  these  authors,  "Empirical 
Exchange  Rate  Models  of  the  Seventies:  Do  They  Fit  Out-of-Sample?" 
Journal of  International Economics  14,  February  1983. 
5/  Relevant  references  here  are John  F.O.  Bilson,  "Macroeconomic 
Stability and  Flexible Exchange  Rates,"  AEA  Papers  and  Proceedings,  May 
1985,  pp.  62-67.  See  also  his  paper  with  David  Hsieh,  "The 
Profitability  of  Currency  Speculation,"  manuscript,  University  of 
Chicago,  1984.  Also,  Paul  Armington  and  Catherine Wolford,  "Identifying 
Opportunities  for  Speculative Profit  Using  the  AWA  Exchange  Rate  Model," 
manuscript,  Armington,  Wolford  and  Associates,  May  1984. 
6/  Evidence  on  the  performance  of  the  AWA  Model  in  forecasting 
direction  versus  accuracy  is  summarized  in  Armington  &  Wolford  paper 
cited  in note  5. 
7/  A  number  of  rather 
equilibrium  exchange  rates  exist. 
this  subject  briefly. 
different  concepts  and  measures  of 
A  companion  paper  (note  2)  surveys 
8/  For  a  recent  example  of  this  sort  of  analysis,  see  OECD, 
Exchange  Rate  Management  and  the  Conduct  of  Monetary  Policy,  Monetary 
Studies  Series,  Paris,  1985. The  AVA  bcbaDse late lloclel 
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A.  Introduction:  data and  notation 
The  AWA  model  deals with  the  stocks of alobal liabilities (or assets) 
outstandina in aiven currencies--those for  Belaiua,  Canada,  France,  Germany, 
Italy, Japan,  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  the United Kinadoa and  the United 
Stat••·  These  stocks are here constructed simply  by  intearatina the adjusted 
current account  balances of  the correspondina countries over  the  sample 
period,  usina arbitrary,  but  lara•.  initial stocks as  the startina points. 
(The  relative size of  these initial stocks  is aiven  by  the weiahts  of  the 
respective currencies  in  the  16-currency  SDR  basket  introduced  by  the  IMP  in 
1974.)  The  current account  data have  been  obtained quarterly  in dollar terms 
(from  the  IMP  Data  Fund),  deflated  by  the u.s.  GNP  deflator,  seasonally 
adjusted,  and  further adjusted  (by a  simple  pro-rata process)  so  that  they  sua 
to  zero across  the  ten countries  in  the model.  Thus,  if the  resultina stocks 
(intearals) are  sWIIIl8d  across  this  ''world"  of  10  111ajor  countries,  "world'• 
liabilities (or assets)  are constant.  That  is,  world  ··wealth"  in this  sense 
is fixed,  by  construction,  but its currency composition varies  in function  of 
the histories of  current account  imbalances -- a  deficit beina assumed  to 
increase  the  relative stock of global wealth  required  to  be  held  in  the 
correspondina currency,  and  a  surplus  beina assumed  to  reduce  that  relative 
st~ck.  Fluctuations  in such  stocks  put  pressure  on  currency values  as  well as 
on  interest rates.  The  model  is a  set of  log-linear equations  that describe 
these  pressures. 
The  other data used  are as  follows:  exchanae  rates are end-of-month 
spot  rates against  the  dollar;  interest  rates are  end-of-month 90-day 
eurocurrency  rates  (except u.s.,  which  is a  domestic  CD  rate);  domestic 
"underlying"  price  levels are annual  GDP  deflators.  Quadratic  interpolation 
is used  to  change all non-monthly  variables  to  frequency  of  one  month,  which 
is  the basic  time  unit of  the  model. 
The  u.s.  dollar is chosen  as  the  numeraire  currency.  There  is no 
equation  for  the u.s.  exchange  rate or  for  the  u.s.  balance  of  payments  (both 
being  implied  by  the  non-u.s.  equations).  There  are,  however,  equations  for 
the  u.s.  interest rate  (9Q-day  CD)  and  domestic  price  level  (GNP  deflator), 
which  are  solved within a  small  sub-model  of  the  United  States  that  also 
includes  total final demand  (for u.s.  output),  private  domestic  demand, 
and  the current  receipts and  payments  of  the  consolidated u.s.  household  and 
business sectors.  1/  This u.s.  model  has  been  estimated  using quarterly data; 
then  the  results hilve  been  re-stated at monthly  frequency  and  merged  with  the 
the  non-u.s.  equations. 
The  only  exogenous  variables  in  the  AWA  Model  are  the  underlying 
trends  of  dom.stic  prices,  plus  dummies  (like TIME)  and  stochastic 
disturbances. 
1/  Documentation  for  this u.s.  model  is available  separately in Armington  and 
1folford  (September  1983). -2-
tn the notation used  below,  non-subscripted variables  refer to any 
particular country,  unless  otherwise noted--i.e.,  any  one  of  the  countries 
included in the model.  Likewise,  parameters  vary across  countries,  except  as 
noted.  Variable  names  designate  the natural  logarithm of  the variable.  For 
interest rates,  the variable is the natural log of  the expression 1  plus  the 
proportionate rate of  intere•t· 
The  notation is a•  follow•: 
Variables  in the 
Non-US  Equations 
(logarithms) 
X 
X 
p 
r 
e 
- e 
*  e 
e 
Description 
stock of liabilities or assets  (in a  particular 
currency) 
desired  (equilibriua)  level of X,  given all 
yields 
effective rate of discount  on  X (equal,  with 
opposite sign,  to  the effective rate of  return 
on  X) 
average  of  p across all assets or countries  in 
the model 
interest rate in terms  of  local currency  (the 
log of  1  plus  the  proportionate rate, 
expressed at a  monthly  rate) lJ 
actual  exchange  rate,  in u.s.  dollars  per  local 
unit 
future  exchange  rate as  expected  by  money 
managers  (adaptive) 
present  underlying  exchange  rate as  interpreted 
by  commercial  traders  (adaptive) 
fundamental  trend of  exchange  rate,  related  only 
to underlying  trend of  price  level 
1/  When  the u.s.  interest rate appears  in the non-u.s.  equations,  the  true 
D!onthly  data  for  the u.s.  90-day  CD  rate is used.  (The  same  series expressed 
at quarterly  frequency  is used  in estimating  the u.s.  sub-model). - p 
r 
r 
R 
R 
Variables  in the 
u.s. Equations  2/ 
(logarithms)  -
r 
p 
y 
z 
M 
D 
T 
u 
-3-
underlying  trend of  the domestic  price  level 
(exogenous),  approximated  by  a  quadratic 
interpolation from  annual data lJ 
desired  interest rate (i.e.,  the appropriate 
rate  from  the standpoint of monetary  policy) 
fundamental  level of r,  related only  to  the 
underlying  trend of  the price level 
the real (or price-level-adjusted)  exchange  rate 
the underlying real exchange  rate,  as  viewed  by 
commercial  traders 
Description 
90-day  CD  rate (the log of 1  plus the 
proportionate rate) 
GNP  deflator 
real final demand  (GNP  less change  in 
inventories) 
exports  of  goods  and  services  plus public-sector 
expenditures  (constant  dollars) 
imports  of  goods  and  services  plus public-sector 
receipts  (constant dollars) 
Y - Z (• real private absorption of  home  output) 
dummy  for  interest rate equation  (1.0  from  1967 
through  1973,  and  zero at other  times) 
dWDIDy  for  "time" 
long-term cycle  dummy,  represented  by  a  sine 
curve with a  period of  forty years,  with 
troughs  in 1960  and  2000  (thus  a  peak  in 1980). 
1/  Also  supplied  for  the United States. P for  the United  States,  while 
~~eated as  exogenous  in the  estimation of  the  non-u.s.  equations,  is (in 
.:orecasting)  derived  from  the  solution for  P  in the u.s.  bloc. 
2/  These  data are obtained quarterly  for  estimation purposes  and  (except  r) 
:lnterpolated to monthly  frequency  when  the U.S.  sector is merged  with  the 1\on-
u.s.  equations.  For~ the  true monthly  series is used  in the merged  model. -4-
a.  Non-u.s.  equations  of  the  behavioral model  1/ 
Demand  for  Assets  (9  independent  equations): 
(1)  X•-o(p- p) 
w 
Parameter  a,  assumed  equal aeross countries,  may  be  interpreted as a  measure 
of  "level-3 saoothing aetivity."  The  (omitted)  constant  tera may  be  viewed  as 
some  portion of  (constant)  world  wealth,  such  that  in the steady state, 
when  p-p  ,  the  demand  for  claims  denominated  in the given curreney is equal  to  w 
that constant  portion of global claims.  In disequilibrium,  p will noraally be 
... 
adjusting so as  to drive X toward  X,  whieh  is in turn determined  by  the 
current account  of  the balance of  payments  (equation 11).  Parameter  a,  the 
elastieity of  substitution between assets denominated  in different currencies, 
is a  rather small  number  (a little over 1--see Table 1),  owing  mainly  to 
uncertainties  about  exchange  rate expectations. 
Stock/flow adjustment  of effective discount  rates  (9  equations): 
... 
(2)  d p  •  '\(X - X)  - &IX 
This  is a  standard adjustment  function used  in models  of  commodity  prices. 
See,  e.g.,  Richard  (1978).  The  effective rate of discount  is  the  '"price"  that 
moves  to clear  the market  for  X.  Both  stock disequilibrium and  flow 
1/  Parameters~  indicated by  Greek  letters,  are expected  to be  positive,  except 
as  noted.  Constants  and  disturbances are not noted  but  are  implicit,  except 
in the definitions.  All relations are stochastic except  (3),  (6),  and  (12). 
The  material  in this section represents  an  updating of,  and  improvement  upon, 
the earlier specification described  in Armington  (January  1982).  A somewhat 
similar system was  described  by  Richard  (1980). -5-
disequilibriua (the current  balance,  dX)  may  affect  P•  The  a1  parameters are 
strongly determined  in  the  estimation and  account  for  most  of  the  adjustment 
of  the  ps.  The  6a,  while  havina  the  riaht sian,  are statistically weak  (see 
Table 1).  In  the hypothetical steady state,  X•X,  dX•O,  and  dp•O.  In  the  true 
diaequilibriwa condition,  movements  in X and  the  limited nature  of  the 
feedback  to X  (since  a  is small)  keep  the  pa  in perpetual motion. 
Definition of  the  effective rate of  discount  (for all 10  countries): 
(3)  p  •  -yr +  s [e - <e - de> 1 - de  l 
Parameters  y  and  s1  are  constrained  to  be  the  same  across  countries.  The 
negative  of  p  can  be  thought  of  as  the  expected  rate of  return on  holding  X, 
expressed at a  monthly  rate.  Correspondingly, .!. and  de  are expressed at 
monthly  rates,  and  e  is  the  asset market's  forecast  positioned one  month  ahead 
in time.  Parameter  y  (now  estimated at  13)  scales  up  the  number  of  interest-
rate  "basis  points"  so  that  they  become  comparable  (in  terms  of  motivating 
capital  flows)  with basis  points  of  expected  gain  or  loss  owing  to  the 
predicted exchange  rate movement.  Parameter  y  exceeds  one  because  future 
exchange  rates  are  not  predictable with  good  accuracy.  The  predicted movement 
is in  turn decomposed  into a  ''trend"  term,  de  ,  and  a  deviation-from-trend 
term  (the  bracketed  expression in  (3))  that  compares  the  present actual 
exchange  rate with  the  expected  rate  "discounted"  to  the  present  using  that 
trend.  Such  a  deviation measures  an  expected capital gain or  loss,  not  over 
one  month  necessarily,  but  over a  period of  time  comparable  to  the  time  it 
would  take  for  e  and  e  to  be  equalized  (assuming  no  further  changes  in~). 
This  represents  an  approximation of  the  rational holding  period of  speculative -6-
positions.  Thus,  to express  this gain or loss at a  monthly  rate,  the 
bracketed expression  in  (3)  needs  to  be  divided  by  the  mean  time  lag  in  the 
adjustment  of  e  to ~·  that is,  multiplied  by  the corresponding  speed  of 
adjustment,  in months.  This  speed of  adjustment  is  the  parameter s1, 
presently estimated  very solidly at 0.4  months  (i.e.,  a  mean  time  lag of  2.5 
months),  as  shown  in Table  1.  Note:  for  the United States,  e•e•e•O. 
Adaptive  expectations  of  the  future  (one  period ahead)  exchange  rate,  as 
interpreted by  asset managers: 
(4)  de •  de  + 6  [ e  - (; - de) 1  1 
This  is  the  standard  formulation  for  adaptive  expectations  in continuous  time; 
with  the  modification  that asset-market  participants are  here  assumed  to  have 
a  view  of  the  underlying  trend  in ~' derived  extraneously  from  a  long-term 
view  of  relative  inflation in  the  respective  country  (see equation 5).  s1  here 
is,  of  course,  the  same  speed  of  adjustment  that  appears  in  (3). 
Link  of  underlying  trend of  exchange  rate  and  underlying  inflation: 
Parameter  ~ is constrained  to  be  the  same  across  countries.  In a  long-run 
equilibrium model  with  a  ''PPP"  assumption,  tp  would  be  expected  to  be  about 
1.0.  We  find,  though,  that  tp  in disequilibrium is  no  more  than  about  0.1. 
Apparently,  uncertainties  surrounding  the  significance of  inflation -7-
differentials  for asset-market pricina,  over horizons  normally  relevant  for 
participants in these markets,  are so great as  to deprive  those differentials 
of  much  direct  impact.  This  doeaa~t mean  that inflation is irrelevant  to 
exchange  rate determination,  but  only that ita systematic influence  in 
disequilibriua (i.e., apart  froa  "neva··  iapacts that would  constitute 
disturbances  in (4))  is transmitted  through  the determination of current 
account  balances  in  (11)  and  hence  to  the asset markets  via (2).  Indeed, 
before  payaents  balances  were  endogenized  in the  model,  ;  was  estimated  to  be 
much  bigger and  stronger statistically.  And  the  more  succesa  we  have  had  in 
endogenizing  the  feedbacks  to  the  flows  and  stocks  in the systea,  the  lower 
the estimate of  '  has  become  and  the  less its significance. 
Definition of 
(6) 
p  :  w 
k. 1, ••• ,10. 
The  ck  are weights,  taken as  SDR  basket  shares  (using  the  16-currency  basket 
introduced  by  the  IMF  in 1974  and  that endured until  1981).  Country  10  here 
is  the  United States,  and  the u.s.  interest rate enters  the  model  at  this 
point  and  hence  influences desired capital  flows  via  (1). 
Equation  blocks  (1)  to  (6)  are  used  to  form  the  "exchange  rate 
equations··  of  the  structural model;  see Part II.C. -8-
Adjustment  of  interest rate•  to appropriate  levele: 
(7)  dr •  A(r  - r) 
This  for.ulation allow•  for  lass in the  iaple  ..  ntation of aonetary  reaction• 
to  the external environment,  these  reactions  beina here  represented  by  changes 
in interest rates on  euro-curreacy deposita.  The  estimates for  A are strong 
and  tightly clustered,  and  they  imply a  mean  time  las,  on  average,  of  three 
weeks  (Table 1). 
The  effective rate of discount l/ as  the  target variable of  international 
financial stabilization policy: 
(8)  r  • 
Parameters  a2  and  a3  may  be  interpreted as  measures  of  "level-4  smoothing 
activity.''  Their signs are expected  to  be  negative,  since if  p  is high,  e  is 
"overvalued,"  and  r  should  fall to achieve a  smoothing  action.  In  this 
formulation,  r  may  be  viewed  as a  proximate  target  of  policies aimed  at 
maintaining,  in international markets,  the  relative attractiveness  of  assets 
denominated  in  local currency.  For  example,  through  policy action that 
reduces  the  average  liquidity of  the  outstanding stock, L  can  presumably  be 
raised,  thus  making  that stock more  attractive to hold  and  inducing desired 
capital inflo•s  through  (3)  and  (1).  Following Phillips  (1954),  a2 can  be 
called the  ''proportional stabilization policy,"  and  a3  can  be  called  the 
Note:  Only  the  disequilibrium variance  of~ is  included  in  (8);  that  is, 
the e  terms  appearing  in  (3)  are dropped  from  (8)  and  (10). -9-
"derivative stabilization policy."  These  policy para11eters,  calculated only 
for  the non-u.s.  countriea,  are very atronaly identified in the  estimation 
(Table 1).  (An  attempt  to eatiaate such an  equation  for  the  United  States sot 
nowhere--the u.s.  eatimatea  for  both a2  and  0)  beina essentially zero).  The 
statistical strenath of  the estimates is attributable in part to  the  choice of 
intereat rate series:  ··domestic"  interest rate aeries generally yield less 
strong results  than  the  euro-deposit  rates used  here. 
Link  of  underlying  level of  the  interest rate and  underlyins  inflation: 
(9)  yr  •  ~p 
This  formulation  is suggested  by  the steady-state conditions  on  "real'• 
interest  rates  that are  implied  by  equation sets  (1)  to  (6).  Since  the 
bracketed expression  in  (3)  is zero  in  the  steady state,  and  since  p  is 
constant  and  equal across  countries  in this state,  there would  be  a  tendency 
for  the  expression  (yr-~P) to  be  equalized across  countries  if the  steady 
state were  approached.  At  the  same  time,  by  definition,  ~would be  tendina 
toward  r  everywhere.  Thus,  interest rate policies would  be  consistent across 
countries  and  with  the  pursuit of  international asset  market  equilibrium if 
(9)  is true.  That  is,  given  (7)  to  (9),  the  interest rate  levels  toward  which 
monetary  policies are  tendina,  as  the authorities'  p-targets are  realized,  are 
the  same  interest  rate  levels  that would  satisfy the  system  (1)  to  (6)  if all 
portfolios and  payments  flows  were  in balance  and  if all exchange  rates  were 
exactly as anticipated.  It might  be  argued,  moreover,  that  if the  steady 
state had  always  been  true,  there would  be  no  basis  for  expecting  y  and  ~ to -10-
differ froa  1;  further,  it is later shown  that  '  must  be  1  in the  steady 
state,  in order  to  be  consi1tent with  the steady state of  the  trade 
equations.  With  these additional stipulations,  therefore,  the  steadf state 
fora of  (9)  is  just the  Fi1her condition. 
The  target  level of  P  for  currency stabilization: 
This  foraulation  is similar  to  p  except:  a)  the  foreign  interest rates  do  not  w 
appear here  (as  a  consequence  of  testa  that  seemed  to  show  only  a  concern  with 
the  exchange  rate  component  of  foreign yields);  b)  only  the non-trend  variance 
of  pw  is  relevant  here;  c)  weights  wk  need  not  be  (and  generally are  not)  the 
same  as  weights  ~·  In computing  p for  the  smaller  EMS  currencies,  for 
example,  we  assume  that Germany  gets  the  preponderant  weight.  The  wk  are  not 
estimated but,  like  the  ck,  are entered as  constants;  they  are  chosen  to  be 
consistent with actual currency arrangements  and  on  the  basis  of  the actual 
results of estimation. 
Equation  blocks  (7)  to  (10),  along  with  (3)  and  (4),  are  used  to  fo~ 
the  "interest rate equations··  of  the structural model;  see Part  It.C. -II-
Linkage  of  the  balance  of  payments  on  current  account  to  the  underlying,  real 
effective exchange  rate and  to  the  current,  real effective exchange  rate: 
(11)  dX  •  ~(R - i  ) + t[R - R ]  w  w 
As  already noted,  a  positive  (or negative)  value of  dX  is associated with  an 
adjusted deficit  (or surplus)  on  current account  (Part It.A.).  Parameters  n 
(expected  to  be  positive)  may  be  interpreted as  measures  of  long-run  "level-5 
s110othing  activity,  ••  critical in generating  turning  points  in the  long-run 
cycles.  The  t  may  be  either positive  (stabilizing)  or negative 
(destabilizing).  Negative  estimates of t  could  serve  to generate  so-called 
"J-curve" effects.  As  it turns  out  (Table 1),  virtually all of  our estimates 
of tare negative  and,  therefore,  destabilizing to  the  systea (i.e., 
contributing to  the  undamped  character of  the  cycles  and  delaying  turning 
points--see Tables  3  and  4).  The  J-curve effects are  particularly strong  for 
Italy and  the  United Kingdom.  On  the  other hand,  the  long-run  "price" 
elasticities  ~ (which  are meant  to  capture all relevant  aspects  of  the  real-
transfer process  following  eventually upon  a  "fundamental"  overvaluation or 
undervaluation of a  currency)  are virtually all positive,  according  to  our 
estimates  (Table  1);  and,  with  some  exceptions,  they  are  at  least as  large  as 
would  seem  broadly consistent with adequate  medium-term  adjustment  (Table 
6).  The  major  exceptions  are  the Netherlands  and  the  United Kingdom,  for  whom 
the  normal  price-volume  relationships were  seriously distorted  in  the  sample 
period by  changes  in the  price of oil and  gas. - 12-
Definition of  the underlyins real exchanse  rate,  as  viewed  by  commercial 
traders: 
where  ~  are trade weights  calculated using the IMF  Multilateral Exchange  Rate 
Model,  as  described  in Artus  and  McGuirk  (1981).  The  current real exchange 
rate,  R,  along with R  ,  is also defined as  in (12),  except  that  the current 
w 
*  exchange  rate, .!_,  replaces e  in both definitions.  R is meant  to pick up 
mainly  short-run,  terms-of-trade effects,  While i  is meant  to measure  the 
competitive  position,  in a  mediua-term sense,  with respect  to  trade  in goods 
and  services.  A positive  (or negative)  value of (i-i ) suggests  that  home  w 
goods  are  viewed  as  overpriced  (or underpriced)  relative to  those of  trading 
partners  taken as  a  whole.  The  weights  ~~ attaching to the various  partner•' 
indices,  are  proportional  to  the  computed  medium-term effects,  on  the  trade 
balance of  the home  country,  of  one-per-cent  changes  (ceteris paribus)  in the 
respective,  partner-country exchange  rates,  using  the  IMF  "MERM"  to  perform 
these calculations.  Thus,  in this sense,  a  reduced  form  of  the  "MERM"  is 
built into  the  AWA  Model  as  a  block of constants. 
Adaptive  formation  of  the  (present)  underlying  exchange  rate,  as  interpreted 
by  commercial  traders: 
Parameter  a 2  can reflect the speed with which  "level-S  smoothing activity"  is 
effected;  thus  a  higher  a 2  can indicate more  such activity per unit of  time. -13-
s2 is solidly estimated at  .OS  (Table  1),  implying a  mean  time  lag of 
slightly leaa  than  two  years.  In other words,  it would  take  about  two  years 
for an  actual change  in ll  (due  to a  change  in ~  to  be  fully  recognlzed  as  an 
underlyina chana•  in  the co•petitive position and  hence  to entail the  real 
adjuat  ..  ata sianified by  n.  (Of  course,  it is immaterial whether  this is 
literally a  "recognition laa"  or a  laa of  some  other nature.)  This  long  lag 
turns out  to  be  a  major  factor,  like  the negative  ,s, contributing to  the 
undaaped  and  attenuted quality of  the  cycles  in  the systea (Table 4). 
*  Equation  (13)  also specifies  that e  will have  an  underlying  trend 
that offsets  the underlying inflation differential vis-a-vis  the United 
States.  In  the  steady state, e•:,  and  R•i•i  •R  •  w  w  Since,  in 
addition,  e•e,  consistency between  (S)  and  (13)  requires  that +•1  in  the 
steady state. 
Equation  blocks  (11)  to  (13)  are  used  to  form  the  "current  account" 
equations  of  the  structural model;  see  Part  II.C. - 14-
c.  Derivation of  the structural model 
(non-u.s.  equations)  from  the  behavioral  model 
This derivation is  lona and  laborious  but  is straight-forward 
algebra,  with  dif!~rentiation required  to set up  the  replacement  of  "expected'. 
or  "underlying"  values  by  their equivalents  in teras of  observable 
variables.  For  detailed notes on  this derivation,  contact Araington,  Wolford 
& Associates. 
To  derive  the  exchange  rate equations,  substitute (1)  into (2),  and 
use  (3),  (4),  and  (5)  or their derivatives  to eliminate  p,  e, and e  as  far as 
possible.  This  leads  to a  first-order system of exchange  rate equations  as 
follows: 
de  •  l  dr 
al  <Tf 
(r-rw)  +  (a1-a1a) e- <a1-a1a)e +  a1a ew- +- ~1a ew  8  s 
(11  .§dX  - (1+8  )~dP -
(l-S1) 
a1  alii( dP-dP  w> 
(1-81) 
~d
2P,  -- X 
81  81  B  B  1 
e  •  w 
Then  differentiate this equation,  substitute  from  (4)  to  eliminate de,  solve 
for  the  e  terms,  and  substitute the  result into  the  above  equation,  so  as  to 
get  rid of all e  terms.  The  result  is a  system  that  is  second-order  in e  and 
r,  which  can  be  written as  follows: -15-
I. 
2  Y  2  c;,o  ~o 
de-- d r- y(l + - 8 )  dr + y-;...ds rw  + c;, ac:le- c;, ac:le..- Y<~1
ar  81  1  1  w 
The  third-order ter., or acceleration in inflation,  has  not  been  included  in 
the estimation;  this exclusion reduces  the  number  of  exogenous  variables  by 
nine and  hence  gains  valuable degrees  o·f  freedom. 
To  derive  the  interest rate equations  of  the  structural model, 
substitute  (10),  and  its derivative,  into  (8).  Also  substitute  (9)  into 
(8).  The  result  is substituted into  (7).  Use  (3),  (4),  and  (5)  to 
eliminate  p,  e,  and  e  as  far  as  possible,  as  above  (note,  however,  footnote 
JJ,  P•  31).  This .leads  to  a  first-order set of  interest rate equations,  as 
follows: 
Then  differetttiate this equation,  substitute  from  (4)  to eliminate de,  solve 
for  the  e  terms,  and  substitute  the  result into  the  above  equation,  so  as  to 
get  rid of  all e  terms.  The  result is a  system  that  is second-order  in  r  and 
e,  which  can  be  written as  follows: -16-
II. 
1 
where  IC  •  r<x  + c;>· 
To  derive  the  balance of  payments  equations  of  the  structural model, 
substitute  (12)  and  the  corresponding definitions of Rand  Rw  into  (11), 
•  yielding a  first-order system  in X and  e: 
•  Then  differentiate this equation,  substitute  from  (13)  to eliminate de,  solve 
•  for  the e  terms,  and  substitute  the  result  into  the  above  equation,  so  as  to 
•  get  rid of all e  terms.  The  result  is a  system  that  is  second  order  in  X,  as 
follows  (d2X being a  measure  of  change  in  the  deflated current  account, 
expressed  as  a  proportion of a  given  stock  figure): 
(Note:  in order  to  reduce  the  number  of  exogenous  variables  by  ten,  and  hence 
gain valuable degrees  of  freedom  in estimation,  we  are  presently using  PW  in 
place of Pw  in set III.) -17-
The  structural model  (excludina  the u.s.  equations  and  identities) 
thus consists of  seta I, II,  and  III,  for  each of  9  countries,  or 27 
equation•·  The  P term.  ("underlyina"  domestic  price  levels,  calculated  by  a 
quadratic  interpolation of  annual  GDP  deflators)  are all treated as  exogenous, 
and  everythina else is endoaenoua.  Por eatiaatioa and  analytical purposes 
this second-order systea is expressed as  a  systea of  27  first-order stochastic 
equations  in (say)  n,  ~~  and  T  plus  27  first-order identities:  n•de,  ~adr, 
and  T•dX.  And  this 54-equation,  first-order systea is  then  merged  with  the 
u.s.  model  (which  is first-order)  to obtain the  system used  for analysis  and 
forecasting.  Some  of  the W-subacripted variables are  included as  separate 
variables  in the model,  with  the  correspondina identities beina added  to  the 
equation set;  however,  in moat  instances  the  individual partner-country 
variables are  simply  included  in the  stochastic equations,  and  the 
restrictions on  their coefficients derived  from  the  theory are carried  through 
in  the  estimation. -18-
D.  The  u.s.  eguations Jj 
Stochastic:: 
(1)  dP  •  upU  +  c:p(Y  - Y) 
(2) 
(3) 
- where  Y •  t
1
T and  u,u •  the c:yc:lic:ally-neutral rate of 
inflation 
dE  •  -c:  (r - u  U)  !  p 
... 
dr •  fr(r - r)  - c:r(Z  - M)  - brdY  - trD +  u,du 
where  r  •  dP 
(5)  dZ  •  fz(Z- Z),  where  z • M 
Identity: 
where  wE  and  wz  are weights. 
1/  All variables are  logarithms  except  for r,  T,  and  D.  For  further 
information,  see  Armington  and  Wolford  (September  1983). -19-
The  U.S.  model  has  a  steady state wherein all real  flows  are  growing 
at  the rate ty  and  where  inflation dP  (• uPU  •  r)  may  be  changing at  the  rate 
updU.  Merging  this model  with  the non-u.s.  equations  (above)  produces  a 
system  in which,  in the  steady state,  "global"  inflation and  the general  level 
of  interest rates  can move  through  the  long cycle while  inflation 
differentials  for  each pair of  countries equal  the  respective interest 
differentials,  which  are  in turn offset by  trends  in exchange  rates 
(with  ~ •  y •  1  in the  steady state).  All balance of  payments  flows  (and 
therefore  the u.s.  public-sector budget)  must  be  in equilibrium in the  steady 
state,  and  all the associated net  foreign debt  (or asset)  stocks are constant. 
The  structural  form  of  the U.S.  model  is: E.  Tables -20-
Table  1.  FIML  Estimates  of Non-u.s.  Model  Parameters* 
Parameter  Country  Estimate  T-value 
~ 
BelgiUII  4.3  4.0 
Canada  0.9  4.7 
France  1.3  4.3 
Germany  1.2  4.7 
Italy  4.6  4.2 
Japan  1.2  4.6 
Netherlands  1.0  4.7 
Switzerland  1.0  4.8 
United Kingdom  0.9  4.3 
Belgium  104.2  1.6 
Canada  5.1  0.9 
France  18.5  1.0 
Germany  3.5  0.4 
Italy  57.8  1.8 
Japan  12.7  2.0 
Netherlands  15.2  1.3 
Switzerland  -19.5  1.4 
United  Kingdom  8.0  0.7 
Constrained across  1.3  5.3 
all countries 
81  Constrained across  0.4  11.4 
all countries 
y  Constrained across  12.9  6.2 
all countries 
cj,  Constrained across  0.1  1.2 
all countries 
Belgium  2.2  6.4 
Canada  1.3  6.5 
France  1.2  7.7 
Germany  1.1  7.1 
Italy  1.4  8.3 
Japan  1.1  6.6 
Netherlands  1.4  7.7 
Switzerland  0.8  6.3 
United  Kingdom  1.3  6.7 -21-
'  BelgiUII  -0.93  21.1 
Canada  -0.95  36.7 
France  -0.75  10.0 
Germany  -0.84  14.6 
Italy  -0.97  14.8 
Japan  -o.8o  11.2 
Netherlands  -0.99  31.9 
Switzerland  -0.98  10.8 
United Kingdo•  -0.92  12.7 
BelgiUII  -0.41  6.2 
Canada  -0.60  6.8 
France  -0.65  6.3 
Germany  -0.59  5.7 
Italy  -0.71  8.0 
Japan  -0.72  5.8 
Netherlands  -0.54  6.8 
Switzerland  -0.74  5.6 
United  Kingdom  -o.S8  5.5 
Belgium.  .0088  3.0 
Canada  .0031  1.0 
France  .0040  1.3 
Germany  .0087  2.1 
Italy  .0521  4.4 
Japan  .0139  3.4 
Netherlands  -.0007  0.2 
Switzerland  .0030  1.4 
United  Kingdom  .0006  0.3 
Belgium  -.0013  1.6 
Canada  -.0024  2.1 
France  -.0005  0.7 
Germany  -.0019  2.2 
Italy  -.0038  2.1 
Japan  -.0015  2.1 
Netherlands  .0011  0.9 
Swit~~;erland  -.0009  1.5 
United Kingdom  -.0035  4.1 
Constrained across  .0502  6.0 
all countries 
*  Estimation of  January  1984;  sample  period  from  April  1973  through 
September  1983.  FIML  estimates  of  the  parameters of  the structural, 
continuous model,  given in Part II.C,  were  computed  using Clifford Wymer's 
program  RESIMpL.  For  this  purpose,  the  approximate discrete  form  of  the 
continuous model  was  derived;  uaing  the  standard  transformations.  See  Wymer, 
Continuous  System  Manual.  The  basic  time unit of  the estimates  above  is 
monthly.·  In this estimation the model  included  the u.s.  variables as 
endogenous,  but  the  parameters  (and constant  terms)  of  the u.s.  equations  were 
fixed at  the  levels  estimated separately (for a  longer  sample  period -- see 
Table  2).  This  procedure  creates a  slight upward  bias in the  t-ratios 
computed  for  th• non-u.s.  parameters. -22-
1/  The  small  seale of  these  "elasticities·· reflects  the  use of  large initial 
C:onstants  for  the intearation of  the current  account  balances  to  form  the 
correspondina  stocks. 
Table  2. 
Paraeter 
Cp 
ty 
Up 
c:E 
fr 
c:r 
br 
tr 
fM 
>  z 
*  FIHL  Estimates of u.s.  Model  Paraaeters 
Estimate  T-value 
.052  3.3 
.025  6.2 
.016  2.7 
1.153  5.8 
.235  1.5 
.031  2.8 
.174  0.8 
.0004  0.5 
.330  3.6 
1.572  42.7 
.061  1.7 
*  Estimates of  September  1983;  sample  period  from  the  third quarter of  1963 
through  the  fourth  quarter of  1982.  FIML  estimates of  the  parameters  of  the 
structural form  of  the u.s. model,  given in Part II.D,  were  computed  using 
Clifford Wymer's  program  RESIMUL.  For  this purpose  the  approximate. discrete 
form  of  the  continuous model  was  derived and  estimated using quarterly data, 
and  the  basic  time  unit of  the  estimates  listed above  is quarterly.  The  basic: 
time  unit  of  the estimated model  was  then changed  to one  month,  and  the u.s. 
model  was  merged  with  the non-u.s.  equations,  for  purposes  of  joint solution 
using Wymer's  program  APREDIC.  Thus,  the U.S.  model  may  be  solved as  a 
closed,  stand-alone model  or as  a  component  of  the  AWA  Exchange  Rate  Model. 
For  further explanation and  analysis  of  these results,  see Armington  and 
Wolford  (September  1983). -23-
Table  3.  Eigenvalues  of  the  AWA  Model 
(Excluding zero  roots) 
Non-u.s.-sector roots  Damping  Period  Period  of Cycle 
Real Part  Imaginary  Part  In Months  In.Months 
1Y  .0158  0  2y  -.0126  0  79.4 
31!  -.01.'16  0  20.3 
4  -.0494  0  20.3 
5  -.0502  0  19.9 
6  -.0506  0  19.8 
7  -.0515  0  19.4 
8  -.0542  0  18.4 
9  -.0556  0  18.0 
10  -.0617  .0013  16.2  4737 
11  -.0617  -.0013  16.2  4737 
12-i? 1!  -.3768  0  2.7 
21- -.5286  0  1.9 
22  -.7518  0  1.;3 
23  -.9724  0  1.0 
24  -1.0905  0  0.9 
25  -1.1062  0  0.9 
26  -1.1773  0  0.8 
27  -1.1912  0  0.8 
28  -1.2635  0  0.8 
29  -1.3770  0  0.7 
30  -1.3850  0  0.7 
31  -1.4779  0  0.7 
32  -1.5380  0  0.7 
33  -1.6472  0  0.6 
34  -2.2325  0  0.4 
35  -5.1102  0  0.2 
36  -5.6486  0  0.2 
37  -1.2983  .0320  0.8  196 
38  -1.2983  -.0320  0.8  196 
3911  .0063  .0445  141  GF 
40  .0063  -.0445  141 
41  .0041  .0376  167  JA 
42  .0041  -.0376  ' 167 
43  .0033  .0304  207  FR 
44  .0033  -.0304  207 
45  .0031  .0227  277  IT 
46  .0031  -.0227  277 
47  .0011  .0055  1148  CA 
48  .0011  -.0055  1148 
49  .0002  .0053  1174  NE 
50  .0002  -.0053  1174 
51  .000002  .0220  286  BE 
52  .000002  -.0220  286 
53  -.00008  .0014  4587  sz 
54  -.00008  -.0014  4587 -M-
u.s.-sector roots 
55  -.004'  0  221 
56  -.1452  0  7 
57  -.0109  .0539  92  117 
58  -.0109  -.0539  92  117 
1/  The  first  two  eigenvalue• are  due  to  the  low  U.K.  estimate 
lror  n,  undoubtedly distorted by  the  North  Sea  oil factor.  If the 
u.K.  n is raised  into a  "normal"  ranae  (see Table  6),  these  roots  become 
roots  of  a  U.K.  exchanae  rate/BOP  cycle,  which  is not  damped. 
1f  Roots  3-11  are associated with  the  speed  of  adjustment s2• 
1J  Roots  12-20 are associated with  the  speed  of adjustment s1• 
4/  Roots  21-38  are associated with  the  speeds  of  adjustment  toward 
~ortfolio balance and  of ~  toward  its target  levels. 
5/  Roots  39-54 are  associated with 8  exchange  rate/BOP  cycles,  one  for 
eiach  of  the  non-u.s.  countries  except  the  U.K.  (see  footnote  1).  The 
countries are noted at  right. -25-
Table 4.  Sensitivity of Estimated Long  Cycles 
to Model  Parameters 
Directional Effect  of an  Algebraic  Increase  in 
Effects on 
Undamped  Cycles 
Germany 
Real  Part 
Imaginary Part 
Japan 
Real  Part 
Imaginary Part 
France 
Real  Part 
Imaginary Part 
Canada 
Real  Part 
Imaginary Part 
Effects  on 
Damped  Cycles 
Netherlands 
Real  Part 
Imaginary  Part 
Belgium 
Real  Part 
Imaginary Part 
a 
+ 
+ 
a  1/ 
2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1'l  1/ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
•  1/ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
Jj  Refers  to  the  parameter estimated  for  the  country  in  the  stub. 
0  1/ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Note:  A negative effect on  a  real part  indicates  that  the  cycle  would  be  less 
----explosive or more  damped  (and  vice  versa).  A positive effect  on  an 
imaginary  part  indicates  that  the  period of  cycle  would  be  reduced  (and 
vice  versa);  hence,  turning  points would  tend  to  be  reached  sooner.  Zero 
indicates approximately  no  effect. Effects 
-26-
Table  5.  Cross  Effects  of  French  and  German  Interest Rate 
Responses  on  Each  Other's Cycles 
Directional Effect  of an  Algebraic  Increase  In: 
German  a2  French  a2 
on: 
Geruoy 
Real  Part  + 
Imaainary Part  + 
France 
Real  Part  + 
Imaainary Part  + 
Note:  See  note  to Table  4.  -
Table  6.  AWA  Estimates  for  Price  "Elasticities·· Compared  with 
Estimates  Implicit  in the  IMP  "MERM" 
.,  Estimates  Implicit  FIML  Estimates 
the  IMF  MERM  1/  of  Tl  (AWA) 
Belgium  .0023  - .0044  .0088 
Canada  .0065  - .0090  .0031 
France  .0042  - .0072  .0040 
Germany  .0035  - .0062  .0087 
Italy  .0078  - .0116  .0521 
Japan  .0055  - .0080  .0139 
Netherlands  .0021  - .0041  -.0007 
Switzerland  .0015  - .0025  .0030 
United Kingdom  .0020 - ·.003'"7- .0.006 !! 
-27-
The  IMP  Multilateral Exchange  Rate  Model  can  be  used  to  simulate  the 
mediua-tera effects on  a  country~s trade  balance of a  one-percent  change 
in ita exchange  rate,  ceteris paribus;  these effects are  comparable 
(after normalization by  initial stock figures  used  in the  AWA  model)  to 
the elasticity  Tl•  The  range  shown  here  corresponds with  the  "Low 
Feedback  Parameters"  and  the "High  Feedback  Parameters,"  Tables  5  and  6, 
pp.  301-4,  of Artus  and  McGuirk  (1981).  The  MERM  effects are sealed  to 
trade  flows  in 1977,  which  is about  the middle  of  the  sample  period  used 
to estimate  the  AWA  model.  The  M!RM  effects do  not  include effects on 
trade in invisible&;  thus it should not  be  surprising if they are saaller 
than  the  comparable  figures  for  Tl• -28-
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